可行的纳什均衡：一个实验

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI:10.1007/s00199-024-01585-6

Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min, John Wooders

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了 Kalai（《可行的纳什均衡：形成与变节》，工作论文，2020 年）对纳什均衡的可行性的衡量。我们通过实验研究了一类参与博弈，这些博弈在参与人数、成功门槛和不参与的回报上都有所不同。我们发现，卡莱的测量方法很好地捕捉到了人人参与（eP）均衡的可行性如何取决于成功门槛；但该测量方法并没有捕捉到博弈中影响 eP 均衡被博弈的可能性的其他因素。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Viable Nash equilibria: an experiment

This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (Viable Nash equilibria: formation and defection. Working paper, 2020)’s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai’s measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.

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来源期刊

Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

23.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and - on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory - cooperative and non-cooperative game theory - macroeconomics - social choice and welfare - uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems) - public economics - international and developmental economics - financial economics, money and banking - industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems. Officially cited as: Econ Theory

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