为 Arm GPU 构建轻量级可信执行环境

IF 7 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI:10.1109/TDSC.2023.3334277
Chenxu Wang, Yunjie Deng, Zhenyu Ning, Kevin Leach, Jin Li, Shoumeng Yan, Zheng-hao He, Jiannong Cao, Fengwei Zhang
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引用次数: 1

摘要

各种 Arm 终端利用集成和离散 GPU 加速计算。然而,业界尚未对 Arm GPU 的安全性进行探讨。现有工作使用可信执行环境(TEE)来解决基于英特尔平台的 GPU 安全问题,但由于存在大量架构差异,为 Arm GPU 部署 TEE 会面临新的技术挑战。我们需要可通用且高效的基于 Arm 的 GPU 安全机制。为了解决这些问题,我们推出了 StrongBox,它是首个在 Arm 端点上进行安全通用计算的 GPU TEE。StrongBox 通过确保对 GPU 的独占访问,提供了一个隔离的执行环境。我们的方法部分基于动态、细粒度的内存保护策略,因为基于 Arm 的 GPU 通常与 CPU 共享统一的内存。此外,StrongBox 还减少了冗余安全反省操作带来的运行时开销。我们还在安全世界中设计了一种有效的防御机制,以保护机密的 GPU 计算。我们的设计利用了广泛部署的 Arm TrustZone 和通用 Arm 功能,无需修改硬件或架构。我们使用现成的 Arm Mali GPU 制作了 StrongBox 原型,并进行了广泛的评估。结果表明,StrongBox 以较低的开销(4.70%-15.26%)成功确保了 GPU 计算的安全性。
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Building a Lightweight Trusted Execution Environment for Arm GPUs
A wide range of Arm endpoints leverage integrated and discrete GPUs to accelerate computation. However, Arm GPU security has not been explored by the community. Existing work has used Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to address GPU security concerns on Intel-based platforms, but there are numerous architectural differences that lead to novel technical challenges in deploying TEEs for Arm GPUs. There is a need for generalizable and efficient Arm-based GPU security mechanisms. To address these problems, we present StrongBox, the first GPU TEE for secured general computation on Arm endpoints. StrongBox provides an isolated execution environment by ensuring exclusive access to GPU. Our approach is based in part on a dynamic, fine-grained memory protection policy as Arm-based GPUs typically share a unified memory with the CPU. Furthermore, StrongBox reduces runtime overhead from the redundant security introspection operations. We also design an effective defense mechanism within secure world to protect the confidential GPU computation. Our design leverages the widely-deployed Arm TrustZone and generic Arm features, without hardware modification or architectural changes. We prototype StrongBox using an off-the-shelf Arm Mali GPU and perform an extensive evaluation. Results show that StrongBox successfully ensures GPU computation security with a low (4.70%–15.26%) overhead.
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 工程技术-计算机:软件工程
CiteScore
11.20
自引率
5.50%
发文量
354
审稿时长
9 months
期刊介绍: The "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC)" is a prestigious journal that publishes high-quality, peer-reviewed research in the field of computer science, specifically targeting the development of dependable and secure computing systems and networks. This journal is dedicated to exploring the fundamental principles, methodologies, and mechanisms that enable the design, modeling, and evaluation of systems that meet the required levels of reliability, security, and performance. The scope of TDSC includes research on measurement, modeling, and simulation techniques that contribute to the understanding and improvement of system performance under various constraints. It also covers the foundations necessary for the joint evaluation, verification, and design of systems that balance performance, security, and dependability. By publishing archival research results, TDSC aims to provide a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and practitioners working in the areas of cybersecurity, fault tolerance, and system reliability. The journal's focus on cutting-edge research ensures that it remains at the forefront of advancements in the field, promoting the development of technologies that are critical for the functioning of modern, complex systems.
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