{"title":"房屋分配问题中的合理公平性：防策略机制的两个特点","authors":"Di Feng, Jacob Coreno","doi":"arxiv-2407.14101","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where\nmonetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of\njustified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties\n(strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial\ndictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms\",\"authors\":\"Di Feng, Jacob Coreno\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2407.14101\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where\\nmonetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of\\njustified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties\\n(strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial\\ndictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501188,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.14101\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.14101","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms
We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where
monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of
justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties
(strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial
dictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
