新股东和投资者的有限关注:私人收购的证据

Mehmet E. Akbulut, Emily Jian Huang, Qingzhong Ma, Athena Wei Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在对私营企业的收购中,当支付大量股票时,预计会形成新的大股东(NewBs)。考虑到监督和认证的好处,投资者会对新大股东的信号做出强烈反应。然而,他们在很大程度上忽略了与价值相关但不太突出的信号,如收购的真实质量。投资者的有限关注使得财务实力较弱的公司可以采取 NewB 战略,进行投机交易。我们的研究结果支持这种注意力不足的假设:NewB收购者的财务实力较弱,获得的公告期回报较高,但长期回报较低;此外,收购者的财务实力对长期业绩的预测为负值。
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New blockholder and investor limited attention: Evidence from private acquisitions
In acquisitions of private firms, new blockholders (NewBs) are expected to form when substantial stocks are paid. Investors react strongly to a NewB signal, given the perceived monitoring and certification benefits. However, they largely ignore value‐relevant but less salient signals, such as the true quality of the acquisition. Investors' limited attention allows financially weak firms to adopt the NewB strategy and take speculative deals. Our results support this inattention hypothesis: NewB acquirers are financially weaker and earn higher announcement‐period returns, but lower long‐run returns; moreover, acquirers' financial weakness negatively predicts long‐run performance.
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