平台提供的信息披露对投资者基础和创业成功的影响:来自众筹的证据

John Bai, Ting Chen, Xiumin Martin, Chi Wan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要 我们采用锐回归不连续设计来识别投资者基础信息披露(IB DISCLOSE)对融资结果和创业成功的因果效应。自 2016 年 2 月起,Kickstarter 开始披露 IB 信息,即一旦一个项目的支持者人数达到 10 人,就会披露支持者的统计数据,包括支持者的地理位置和以往的融资经验。利用这种不连续性,我们发现披露信息会使融资成功的可能性增加 10%,认捐资金额增加 13%。当项目质量较高时,以及当项目的创造者可信度较低、事前不确定性较高、创造者与支持者之间信息不对称程度较高以及支持者的财务成本较高时,这种效应会更加明显。我们还发现,IB DISCLOSE 增加了产品交付的可能性。我们的研究强调了平台提供的信息披露在提高资本分配效率方面的重要性。JEL 分类:M41;G24;L15;O31;D04。
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Platform-Provided Disclosure on Investor Base and Entrepreneurial Success: Evidence from Crowdfunding
ABSTRACT We employ a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effects of investor-base disclosure (IB DISCLOSE) on funding outcomes and entrepreneurship success. Since February 2016, Kickstarter has disclosed IB information, namely, backer statistics including geographic locations and previous funding experience of the backers, once the number of backers for a project reaches ten. Exploiting this discontinuity, we show the disclosure increases the likelihood of funding success by 10 percent and the amount of funds pledged by 13 percent. The effect is more pronounced when the project quality is high and for projects with less credible creators, high ex ante uncertainty, high information asymmetry between creators and backers, and high financial costs to backers. We also find IB DISCLOSE increases the likelihood of product delivery. Our study highlights the importance of platform-provided disclosure in improving the efficiency of capital allocation. JEL Classifications: M41; G24; L15; O31; D04.
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