公共合同的刚性:对续约动态的影响

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance Pub Date : 2024-09-26 DOI:10.1016/j.qref.2024.101924
Marian W. Moszoro , Stéphane Saussier , Jean Beuve
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了公共合同的刚性如何影响合同续签的频率。通过使用公私停车场合同数据集和机器阅读技术来评估合同刚性,我们发现合同刚性的增强,尤其是诉讼条款的增强,会显著提高合同续签的概率。我们的研究结果表明,程序性沉没成本和合同刚性赋予在职者的竞争优势是导致合同更频繁续签的关键因素。本研究强调了政治可竞争性和刚性的重要性,为合同重新谈判的最佳策略提供了宝贵的见解,从而加深了我们对公共合同续签的理解。
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Rigidity in public contracts: Implications for renewal dynamics
We investigate how the rigidity of public contracts influences the frequency of their renewal. Using a dataset of contracts for public–private car parks and employing machine-reading techniques to assess contract rigidity, we find that heightened contract rigidity, particularly in litigation clauses, significantly raises the probability of contract renewal. Our findings indicate that procedural sunk costs and the competitive advantage conferred to incumbents by contract rigidity are key factors contributing to more frequent renewals. This study enhances our comprehension of public contract renewals by emphasizing the significance of political contestability and rigidity, providing valuable insights into optimal strategies for contract renegotiation.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
2.90%
发文量
118
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.
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