Land reform, emerging grassroots democracy and political trust in China

This study explores how the application of democratic rule in land reform decision-making determines villagers’ political trust towards different levels of the government in China. Analyzing a two-period household survey dataset, we find that in China’s recent Collective Forest Tenure Reform, which has devolved the tenure rights of the village collective-owned forestland to households, democratic decision-making increases trust for town and county cadres. The impact on trust towards village cadres is significant only when democracy involves all villagers in a village. We show two mechanisms that improve villagers’ trust: the “privatization” effect, where democratic decision-making leads to more land devolved to villagers, and the “conflict-resolving” effect, where improved information and cohesion by mass participation helps resolve inter-village land disputes. Heterogeneity analyses show that democratic decision-making has a more pronounced effect in improving trust for villagers with lower income, and those without affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party or village committees.