能源行业的监管捕获:来自印度尼西亚的证据

I. Prihandono, E. Widiati
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Regulatory capture in energy sector: evidence from Indonesia
ABSTRACT Regulatory capture reflects a phenomenon in which a regulatory agency, initially established to cater the interests of the public, formulates a policy based on private or ‘special’ interests. Actors within the legislative process are influenced by external parties or may even fall for regulatory capture as they have engraved a mindset that sides with the regulated industry. Regulatory capture is more likely to occur when there is a lack of public participation, transparency, and imbalance access to information. It is also much more prominent when the regulation is made to govern a profitable sector. Although regulatory capture has been numerously addressed, this paper focuses specifically on the challenges posed by regulatory capture in Indonesia’s energy sector, particularly with respect to one of its profitable sectors – the coal-fired power plant industry. Despite Indonesia’s expressed intention to transition to renewable energy and the apparent environmental impacts of coal-fired power plants, regulations regarding such a sector are still made to favour businesses. This relates to the fact that many political actors who hold positions as legislators and regulators also wield important positions in Indonesia’s coal-fired power plant companies. This paper illustrates the tension and struggle between the two contrasting interests of businesses and the public by looking into the theoretical framework of regulatory capture and public interests. Subsequently, it extracts the elements of regulatory capture and utilizes it to identify whether regulatory capture is inherent in Indonesia’s coal-fired power plant industry. Ways to prevent regulatory capture are further explored. In doing so, this paper resorts to a doctrinal and normative method. The analysis conducted leads to the conclusion that there are apparent signs of political influence in the coal-fired power plant industry, indicating the existence of regulatory capture. As such, measures to prevent and eradicate regulatory capture should be implemented by the government.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.50
自引率
10.00%
发文量
23
期刊介绍: The Theory and Practice of Legislation aims to offer an international and interdisciplinary forum for the examination of legislation. The focus of the journal, which succeeds the former title Legisprudence, remains with legislation in its broadest sense. Legislation is seen as both process and product, reflection of theoretical assumptions and a skill. The journal addresses formal legislation, and its alternatives (such as covenants, regulation by non-state actors etc.). The editors welcome articles on systematic (as opposed to historical) issues, including drafting techniques, the introduction of open standards, evidence-based drafting, pre- and post-legislative scrutiny for effectiveness and efficiency, the utility and necessity of codification, IT in legislation, the legitimacy of legislation in view of fundamental principles and rights, law and language, and the link between legislator and judge. Comparative and interdisciplinary approaches are encouraged. But dogmatic descriptions of positive law are outside the scope of the journal. The journal offers a combination of themed issues and general issues. All articles are submitted to double blind review.
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