断言很弱

IF 1.4 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI:10.3998/phimp.1076
M. Mandelkern, Kevin Dorst
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引用次数: 8

摘要

最近的研究表明,信仰是脆弱的:信仰所需的理性信任水平相对较低。该文献将信念与断言进行了对比,认为后者需要一种比(弱)信念更强的认识状态——也许是知识,甚至是确定性。我们认为这是错误的:断言和信念一样脆弱。我们首先提出了各种新的论点,然后证明了更强规范的标准论点是不令人信服的。最后,我们描绘了一个替代的画面,在这个画面上,断言的基本准则是说出你的信仰,但信仰和断言都是脆弱的。为了帮助理解这一点,我们提出,信念和断言都涉及在准确性和非信息性之间进行权衡,因此,如果信息足够丰富,相信/说一些你只有微弱证据的事情是有意义的。
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Assertion is weak
Recent work has argued that belief is weak: the level of rational credence required for belief is relatively low. That literature has  contrasted belief with assertion, arguing that the latter requires an epistemic state much stronger than (weak) belief---perhaps knowledge or even certainty.  We argue that this is wrong: assertion is just as weak as belief.  We first present a variety of new arguments for this, and then show that the standard arguments for stronger norms are not convincing.  Finally, we sketch an alternative picture on which the fundamental norm of assertion is to say what you believe, but both belief and assertion are weak. To help make sense of this, we propose that both belief and assertion involve navigating a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity, and so it can makes sense to believe/say something you only have weak evidence for, if it is informative enough.
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来源期刊
Philosophers' Imprint
Philosophers' Imprint PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
27
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊最新文献
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