首席财务官与首席执行官:冒险动机与公司政策决策

IF 1.2 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Investment Analysts Journal Pub Date : 2021-10-02 DOI:10.1080/10293523.2021.2010373

Han‐Ching Huang, P. Tung

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们对首席执行官(ceo)和首席财务官(cfo)的股权激励对公司政策决策的影响进行了广泛的研究，发现收购方ceo的冒险激励对公司进行收购的可能性比首席财务官有更大的影响，从而扩展了更高的冒险激励促使ceo进行更多投资的论点。更高的风险降低激励与更大的公司进行回购和经验丰富的股票发行(seo)的可能性有关。具体而言，与ceo相比，cfo的冒险动机导致企业进行回购和seo的可能性更大。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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CFOs versus CEOs: Risk-taking incentives and decisions of corporate policies

ABSTRACT We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of the equity incentives of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) on decisions relating to corporate policies and find that the risk-taking incentives of acquirer CEOs have a greater impact on the probability that firms conduct an acquisition than CFOs, extending the argument that higher risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to undertake more investments. Higher risk-decreasing incentives are associated with greater probability of firms conducting repurchases and seasoned equity issues (SEOs). Specifically, compared with CEOs, the risk-taking incentives of CFOs induce greater probability that firms conduct repurchases and SEOs.

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来源期刊

Investment Analysts Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Investment Analysts Journal is an international, peer-reviewed journal, publishing high-quality, original research three times a year. The journal publishes significant new research in finance and investments and seeks to establish a balance between theoretical and empirical studies. Papers written in any areas of finance, investment, accounting and economics will be considered for publication. All contributions are welcome but are subject to an objective selection procedure to ensure that published articles answer the criteria of scientific objectivity, importance and replicability. Readability and good writing style are important. No articles which have been published or are under review elsewhere will be considered. All submitted manuscripts are subject to initial appraisal by the Editor, and, if found suitable for further consideration, to peer review by independent, anonymous expert referees. All peer review is double blind and submission is via email. Accepted papers will then pass through originality checking software. The editors reserve the right to make the final decision with respect to publication.