基于博弈理论的中国工业用地治理集约利用研究

IF 3.9 2区 社会学 Q1 URBAN STUDIES Journal of Urban Management Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jum.2022.02.003
Jiaojiao Luo , Yuzhe Wu , Charles L. Choguill , Xiaobin Zhang
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引用次数: 6

摘要

自上世纪末以来,大量使用工业用地已成为中国许多城市的典型现象。其中最重要的原因是地方政府在土地利用上的战略选择。本研究从分税制和绩效考核制度的角度构建治理结构,运用博弈论分析解释土地粗放利用的原因。研究发现,工业用地治理结构是一个由中央政府、地方政府和市场组成的组织结构,三者之间存在着相互制约的关系,形成一个闭环。但这种结构缺乏自下而上的市场关系链,难以依靠地方政府自行实施工业用地集约利用。博弈均衡分析表明,如果考虑一个绩效惩罚系数来完善现有的绩效评估体系,以帮助产生市场反馈,那么地方政府采取广泛土地利用战略的可能性将会降低。
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A study on promoting the intensive use of industrial land in China through governance: A game theoretical approach

Extensive use of industrial land has been typical for many cities in China since the end of the previous century. One of the most important reasons is the local governments’ strategy choice in land use. In this research, a governance structure from the view of the tax-sharing system and the performance appraisal system is constructed to explain the causes of extensive land use using game theory analysis. The key finding is that the governance structure in industrial land use is an organizational structure composed of the central government, local government and the market, and these three participants hold inter-conditioned relationships so as to form a closed loop. However, a bottom-up relationship chain from the market is absent in this structure, which makes it difficult to rely on local governments to implement intensive use of industrial land by themselves. Game equilibrium analysis shows that if a performance penalty coefficient is considered to refine the existing performance appraisal system to help produce a market feedback, the possibility of local governments adopting extensive land use strategies will be reduced.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.50
自引率
4.90%
发文量
45
审稿时长
65 days
期刊介绍: Journal of Urban Management (JUM) is the Official Journal of Zhejiang University and the Chinese Association of Urban Management, an international, peer-reviewed open access journal covering planning, administering, regulating, and governing urban complexity. JUM has its two-fold aims set to integrate the studies across fields in urban planning and management, as well as to provide a more holistic perspective on problem solving. 1) Explore innovative management skills for taming thorny problems that arise with global urbanization 2) Provide a platform to deal with urban affairs whose solutions must be looked at from an interdisciplinary perspective.
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