地下水利用和战略补充：第一部分（工具变量）

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2022-10-15 DOI:10.3390/g13050067

Caleb M. Koch, H. Nax

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们使用占美国灌溉农业3%的地下水使用量的个体水平数据集，测试了公共水池资源博弈中的决策在理论上是否是更好的战略替代或补充博弈模型。基于具有工具变量的回归框架，我们发现了对战略互补的支持，这表明互惠和/或竞相枯竭的动力学是理解地下水使用的关键。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part I (Instrumental Variables)

We test whether the decisions in a common-pool resource game are better modeled game-theoretically as strategic substitutes or complements using an individual-level dataset of groundwater usage that accounts for 3% of US irrigated agriculture. Based on a regression framework with instrumental variables, we find support for strategic complements, suggesting that reciprocity– and/or race-to-depletion–like dynamics are key to understanding groundwater usage.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.

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