外国直接投资、腐败和体制改革

IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Panoeconomicus Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI:10.2298/pan181214011e
R. Salvador
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引用次数: 0

摘要

腐败影响企业之间的竞争条件和外国投资的流动。为打击腐败而进行的体制改革有时是无用的。我们建立了一个模型,在这个模型中,腐败的政府试图设定一个最优的制度水平,同时考虑到该政策对外国投资的成本、腐败的国内企业的利益和当地公民的利益。政治捐款是由腐败的游说团体提供的,目的是为了从较低的制度层面上受益。我们的研究结果表明,最优制度水平取决于企业的效率程度和东道国政府的腐败程度。关键词:腐败、游说、制度改革、外商直接投资Jel: f21, f30, k42
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Foreign direct investment, corruption, and institutional reforms
Corruption impacts the competitive conditions among firms and the flow of foreign investment. Institutional reforms made for fighting against corruption are sometimes useless. We develop a model in which a corrupted government tries to set an optimal institutional level taking into account the cost of this policy on foreign investment, the benefit of a corrupted domestic firm and the benefit of local citizens. A political contribution is made by a corrupted lobby group in order to benefit from a lower institutional level. Our results suggest that the optimal institutional level depends on the degree of efficiency of firms and the level of corruption of the host government. Key words: Corruption, Lobbying, Institutional reforms, Foreign direct investment. JEL: F21, F30, K42
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来源期刊
Panoeconomicus
Panoeconomicus ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
40 weeks
期刊最新文献
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