Existence as a first-order predicate: Themes from Mirdamad

ABSTRACT Mirdamad, a prominent philosopher of the Late Medieval Period active in the Islamic world, regards existence as nothing in reality. In this paper, I employ methods devised by contemporary analytic philosophers to reinterpret his theory of existence. Based on my interpretation, this theory of existence has many aspects. Metaphysically, existence is nothing in reality. In effect, it is not a property of individuals. Logically, ‘existence’ is a first-order predicate. In order to make these two claims consistent, he develops a sparse theory of properties, proposes an analysis of the meaning of ‘existence’, appeals to a meta-metaphysical view about the language of metaphysics, develops a truthmaker theory of truth, and commits to a specific theory of grounding. Arguably, this theory of existence seems to be tenable from a contemporary analytic perspective.