边境博弈:无证移民的博弈模型

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2023-08-24 DOI:10.3390/g14050058

J. Yazar, Robert J. Gitter

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑了一个无证移民的博弈论模型，目的是强调影响该问题的不同力量之间的战略互动。具体而言，我们分析了目的地国的企业、本土劳动力、目的地国民选官员和来源国无证移民之间的战略互动。我们表明，边境执法的影响受到了抑制，因为参与者之间的战略互动往往会压制任何单方面的变化。我们还研究了劳动力市场的不确定性对移民问题的影响，并分析了决策者必须在市场状态实现之前（事前）或之后（事后）做出决定的两种情况。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Border Games: A Game Theoretic Model of Undocumented Immigration

We consider a game-theoretic model of undocumented immigration with the aim of emphasizing the strategic interaction between the different forces affecting the issue. Specifically, we analyze the strategic interaction between firms in the destination country, native labor, the elected officials in the destination country, and the undocumented immigrants from the Source Country. We show that the impact of border enforcement is dampened because strategic interaction between the players will tend to mute any unilateral changes. We also study the effect of uncertainty in the labor market on migration issues and analyze the two cases where policymakers have to make their decisions before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the market state is realized.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.

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