证伪主义与归纳的语用问题

IF 0.3 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Organon F Pub Date : 2020-11-01 DOI:10.31577/orgf.2020.27405

D. Frederick

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引用次数: 2

摘要

我解释了卡尔·波普尔是如何解决归纳问题的，而不是归纳的语用问题。我表明，波普尔提出的归纳语用问题的解决方案与他提出的归纳问题的解决方法不一致。我解释了波普尔的证伪主义认识论如何以解决归纳问题的消极方式解决归纳的语用问题。

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Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction

I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s proposed solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.

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来源期刊

Organon F PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

20.00%

发文量

审稿时长

38 weeks

期刊介绍： Organon F publishes high-quality articles on the entire range of topics discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Accordingly, we invite authors to submit articles that address issues that belong, but are not limited, to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. We also consider analytically written articles on ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political philosophy and history of philosophy. The principal aim is to publish original articles that meet the standards typical of analytic philosophy, primarily those of conceptual clarity, precision and soundness of argumentation.

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