具有非拟线性偏好的对象分配问题的对等性和策略证明

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2022-11-15 DOI:10.3390/g13060075
Hiroki Shinozaki
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑了在智能体数量超过对象数量的情况下,将异构对象分配给有钱的智能体的问题。每个代理最多可以接收一个对象,有些对象可能仍然未分配。捆绑包是由对象和支付组成的一对。代理对捆绑包的偏好可能不是准线性的,这表现出收入效应或反映了借贷成本。我们研究了一类满足文献中公平的中心性质之一的规则,平等-等价,以及其他可取的性质。我们提出了(i)一类新的规则,我们称之为具有变量约束的独立二次价格规则,以及(ii)一个新的约束条件,我们称之为尊重估值一致性。然后,我们证明了尊重估值一致性的变量约束的独立二次价格规则是唯一满足平均等价性、策略证明性、个体理性和不补贴输家的规则。我们的表征结果表明,在三个或更多智能体的情况下,智能体很少有机会在满足平等等价和其他期望属性的规则下接收对象,这突出了平等等价和效率之间的强烈张力。相反,在两个主体和一个对象的情况下,平均对等与效率是相容的。
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Egalitarian-Equivalence and Strategy-Proofness in the Object Allocation Problem with Non-Quasi-Linear Preferences
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous objects to agents with money, where the number of agents exceeds that of objects. Each agent can receive at most one object, and some objects may remain unallocated. A bundle is a pair consisting of an object and a payment. An agent’s preference over bundles may not be quasi-linear, which exhibits income effects or reflects borrowing costs. We investigate the class of rules satisfying one of the central properties of fairness in the literature, egalitarian-equivalence, together with the other desirable properties. We propose (i) a novel class of rules that we call the independent second-prices rules with variable constraints and (ii) a novel condition on constraints that we call respecting the valuation coincidence. Then, we establish that the independent second-prices rule with variable constraints that respects the valuation coincidence is the only rule satisfying egalitarian-equivalence, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers. Our characterization result implies that in the case of three or more agents, there are few opportunities for agents to receive objects under a rule satisfying egalitarian-equivalence and the other desirable properties, which highlights the strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency. In contrast, in the case of two agents and a single object, egalitarian-equivalence is compatible with efficiency.
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来源期刊
Games
Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
65
审稿时长
11 weeks
期刊介绍: Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.
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