没有消息就是坏消息:PCAOB第二部分报告对年度被检查事务所的审计费用和审计质量有影响吗?

IF 1.1 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting Literature Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.acclit.2018.01.002
Elizabeth Johnson , Kenneth J. Reichelt , Jared S. Soileau
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引用次数: 20

摘要

我们研究了PCAOB第二部分报告对年度被检查事务所的审计费用和审计质量的影响。PCAOB用对审计公司的独立检查取代了同行评议审计程序。在每次检查完成后,PCAOB发布检查报告,其中包括已确定的审计缺陷的公开部分(第一部分),以及(在大多数情况下)已确定的质量控制弱点的非公开部分(第二部分)。第二部分报告只有在PCAOB认为补救措施不足的情况下,才会在至少12个月后公布。从2007年德勤谴责开始(Boone et al., 2015), PCAOB从软协同方法转向对抗方法,使得第二部分报告迫在眉睫,尽管延迟最终导致其发布时间比预期晚了一到四年。我们的研究时间跨度为2007年至2015年,并考察了第二部分报告最早可能发布的日期(即第一部分报告发布后12个月)对审计费用和审计质量的影响。我们发现,在12个月期间之后,每年接受检查的审计事务所最终因降低审计费用而失去声誉,同时他们也采取补救措施提高客户财务报告质量(异常应计规模和重述)。然而,在第二部分报告实际发布三年后,审计费用增加了。
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No news is bad news: Do PCAOB part II reports have an effect on annually inspected firms’ audit fees and audit quality?

We investigate the effect of the PCAOB’s Part II report on annually inspected firms’ audit fees and audit quality. The PCAOB replaced the peer review auditor program with an independent inspection of audit firms. Upon completion of each inspection, the PCAOB issued inspection reports that include a public portion (Part I) of identified audit deficiencies, and (in most cases) a nonpublic portion (Part II) of identified quality control weaknesses. The Part II report is only made public when the PCAOB deems that remediation was insufficient after at least 12 months have passed. Starting around the time of the 2007 Deloitte censure (Boone et al., 2015), the PCAOB shifted from a soft synergistic approach to an antagonistic approach, such that Part II reports were imminent, despite delays that ultimately led to their release one to four years later than expected. Our study spans the period from 2007 to 2015, and examines the effect on audit fees and audit quality at the earliest date that the Part II report could have been released – 12 months after the Part I report was issued. We find that following the 12 month period, that annually inspected audit firms eventually lost reputation by lower audit fees, while they concurrently made remedial efforts to increase the quality of their client’s financial reporting quality (abnormal accruals magnitude and restatements). However, three years after the Part II report was actually released, audit fees increased.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
6
期刊介绍: The objective of the Journal is to publish papers that make a fundamental and substantial contribution to the understanding of accounting phenomena. To this end, the Journal intends to publish papers that (1) synthesize an area of research in a concise and rigorous manner to assist academics and others to gain knowledge and appreciation of diverse research areas or (2) present high quality, multi-method, original research on a broad range of topics relevant to accounting, auditing and taxation. Topical coverage is broad and inclusive covering virtually all aspects of accounting. Consistent with the historical mission of the Journal, it is expected that the lead article of each issue will be a synthesis article on an important research topic. Other manuscripts to be included in a given issue will be a mix of synthesis and original research papers. In addition to traditional research topics and methods, we actively solicit manuscripts of the including, but not limited to, the following: • meta-analyses • field studies • critiques of papers published in other journals • emerging developments in accounting theory • commentaries on current issues • innovative experimental research with strong grounding in cognitive, social or anthropological sciences • creative archival analyses using non-standard methodologies or data sources with strong grounding in various social sciences • book reviews • "idea" papers that don''t fit into other established categories.
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Ontological basis of the creative accounting phenomenon as a financial misstatement The valuation and determinants of franking account balances Unveiling the hidden symphony: board dynamics and carbon emission disclosure – a meta-analysis study in the realm of developed markets Trade-based money laundering: a systematic literature review Theories underlying environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure: a systematic review of accounting studies
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