{"title":"网络平台质量、折扣与广告：理论分析","authors":"Sangita Poddar, Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee), Swapnendu Banerjee","doi":"10.1016/j.iimb.2022.03.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper discusses the optimal strategies of a two-sided monopoly platform where the platform offers price discount to buyers. The platform uses advertising instruments to transmit information about discount to buyers and also provides service to its buyers. Although discount adds utility to buyers only, it affects per-interaction price of both buyers and sellers because of the presence of indirect network externality. The model analysis shows that service quality and level of advertisement will reduce unambiguously with discount for the monopoly platform. A comparison of monopoly equilibrium with the social optimum reveals that the monopoly platform sets higher service quality compared to the social planner.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46337,"journal":{"name":"IIMB Management Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"Pages 68-82"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0970389622000210/pdfft?md5=279ab45f2dbc84418172e69003594a5e&pid=1-s2.0-S0970389622000210-main.pdf","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Online platform quality, discount, and advertising: A theoretical analysis\",\"authors\":\"Sangita Poddar, Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee), Swapnendu Banerjee\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.iimb.2022.03.004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The paper discusses the optimal strategies of a two-sided monopoly platform where the platform offers price discount to buyers. The platform uses advertising instruments to transmit information about discount to buyers and also provides service to its buyers. Although discount adds utility to buyers only, it affects per-interaction price of both buyers and sellers because of the presence of indirect network externality. The model analysis shows that service quality and level of advertisement will reduce unambiguously with discount for the monopoly platform. A comparison of monopoly equilibrium with the social optimum reveals that the monopoly platform sets higher service quality compared to the social planner.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46337,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IIMB Management Review\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"Pages 68-82\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0970389622000210/pdfft?md5=279ab45f2dbc84418172e69003594a5e&pid=1-s2.0-S0970389622000210-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IIMB Management Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0970389622000210\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IIMB Management Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0970389622000210","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
Online platform quality, discount, and advertising: A theoretical analysis
The paper discusses the optimal strategies of a two-sided monopoly platform where the platform offers price discount to buyers. The platform uses advertising instruments to transmit information about discount to buyers and also provides service to its buyers. Although discount adds utility to buyers only, it affects per-interaction price of both buyers and sellers because of the presence of indirect network externality. The model analysis shows that service quality and level of advertisement will reduce unambiguously with discount for the monopoly platform. A comparison of monopoly equilibrium with the social optimum reveals that the monopoly platform sets higher service quality compared to the social planner.
期刊介绍：
IIMB Management Review (IMR) is a quarterly journal brought out by the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. Addressed to management practitioners, researchers and academics, IMR aims to engage rigorously with practices, concepts and ideas in the field of management, with an emphasis on providing managerial insights, in a reader friendly format. To this end IMR invites manuscripts that provide novel managerial insights in any of the core business functions. The manuscript should be rigorous, that is, the findings should be supported by either empirical data or a well-justified theoretical model, and well written. While these two requirements are necessary for acceptance, they do not guarantee acceptance. The sole criterion for publication is contribution to the extant management literature.Although all manuscripts are welcome, our special emphasis is on papers that focus on emerging economies throughout the world. Such papers may either improve our understanding of markets in such economies through novel analyses or build models by taking into account the special characteristics of such economies to provide guidance to managers.
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