为什么有些产品创新获得了许可，而有些则没有?

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS Research in Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2023.02.001

Manel Antelo , Lluís Bru

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们在Stackelberg产业中研究了体现创新(提高质量的产品)的产品许可，其所有者可能是在产品市场设定产量时扮演领导者或追随者角色的公司。我们发现，如果创新的所有者是市场领导者企业，创新就会转移(社会福利就会减少)。然而，如果创新是在跟随市场的公司手中，它就没有获得许可，即使许可会增加福利。因此，通过对由此产生的创新进行强制许可来补贴研发可能是一项社会可取的政策。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Why some product innovations are licensed and others are not?

We study in a Stackelberg industry the licensing of a product that embodies an innovation (quality-improving product) whose owner may be the firm that plays as a leader or a follower in setting output in the the product market. We find that the innovation is transferred (and social welfare is reduced) if its owner is the market-leader firm. However, if the innovation is in the hands of the market-follower firm, it is not licensed, even though licensing would be welfare enhancing. Thus, subsidizing R&D with the mandatory licensing of the resulting innovation may be a socially desirable policy.

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来源期刊

Research in Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

89 days

期刊介绍： Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.