知识是基于事实的信念

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI:10.5406/21521123.59.4.06
G. Piccinini
{"title":"知识是基于事实的信念","authors":"G. Piccinini","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.06","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Knowledge is factually grounded belief. This account uses the same ingredients as the traditional analysis—belief, truth, and justification—but posits a different relation between them. While the traditional analysis begins with true belief and improves it by simply adding justification, this account begins with belief, improves it by grounding it, and then improves it further by grounding it in the facts. In other words, for a belief to be knowledge, it's not enough that it be true and justified; for a belief to be knowledge, it must be justified by the facts. This account solves the Gettier problem. Gettierized beliefs fall short of knowledge because, albeit true and justified, they are not grounded in the facts. This account also elucidates why knowledge attributions are sensitive to epistemic standards. It's because whether we take a belief to be grounded in the facts is sensitive to epistemic standards.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief\",\"authors\":\"G. Piccinini\",\"doi\":\"10.5406/21521123.59.4.06\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Knowledge is factually grounded belief. This account uses the same ingredients as the traditional analysis—belief, truth, and justification—but posits a different relation between them. While the traditional analysis begins with true belief and improves it by simply adding justification, this account begins with belief, improves it by grounding it, and then improves it further by grounding it in the facts. In other words, for a belief to be knowledge, it's not enough that it be true and justified; for a belief to be knowledge, it must be justified by the facts. This account solves the Gettier problem. Gettierized beliefs fall short of knowledge because, albeit true and justified, they are not grounded in the facts. This account also elucidates why knowledge attributions are sensitive to epistemic standards. It's because whether we take a belief to be grounded in the facts is sensitive to epistemic standards.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47459,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.06\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.06","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

知识是有事实根据的信念。这种解释使用了与传统分析相同的成分——信念、真相和证明——但假定它们之间的关系不同。传统的分析从真实的信念开始,通过简单地添加理由来改进它,而这种描述从信念开始,通过建立它来改进它,然后通过将它建立在事实基础上进一步改进它。换句话说,一种信仰要成为知识,仅仅是真实和合理是不够的;一种信念要成为知识,就必须有事实证明。这个帐户解决了Gettier问题。被归类的信念缺乏知识,因为尽管它们是正确的、有道理的,但它们没有以事实为基础。这一解释也阐明了为什么知识归因对认知标准很敏感。这是因为我们是否把一个信念建立在事实的基础上是对认知标准很敏感的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief
Knowledge is factually grounded belief. This account uses the same ingredients as the traditional analysis—belief, truth, and justification—but posits a different relation between them. While the traditional analysis begins with true belief and improves it by simply adding justification, this account begins with belief, improves it by grounding it, and then improves it further by grounding it in the facts. In other words, for a belief to be knowledge, it's not enough that it be true and justified; for a belief to be knowledge, it must be justified by the facts. This account solves the Gettier problem. Gettierized beliefs fall short of knowledge because, albeit true and justified, they are not grounded in the facts. This account also elucidates why knowledge attributions are sensitive to epistemic standards. It's because whether we take a belief to be grounded in the facts is sensitive to epistemic standards.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.
期刊最新文献
Race and Class Together Virtue Ethics in Social Theory Structural Racism Within Reason What Does it Mean to Say “The Criminal Justice System is Racist”? Anti-Asian Racism
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1