Thinking Outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck

The very idea of moral luck poses a puzzle. In fact, Bernard Williams, who introduced the phrase “moral luck,” writes that he “expected to suggest an oxymoron” (Williams 1993: 251). As I will understand it here, moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment, despite the fact that a significant aspect of what he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his control (Nagel 1979). Williams (1981) had suggested that the idea of luck—or being outside of our control—is simply inconsistent with the idea of moral assessment. The more specific claim that will be the focus here is that the idea of luck is inconsistent with a particular form of moral assessment, namely, moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And in fact, I will focus on a specific kind of moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, namely, that associated with moral responsibility understood as accountability. In this sense of responsibility, we are responsible agents insofar as we are subjects of legitimate moral demands and apt candidates for being held to account when it comes to meeting those demands.1