{"title":"安静的政治、工会和政治精英网络:丹麦的案例*","authors":"C. Ibsen, C. Ellersgaard, Anton Grau Larsen","doi":"10.1177/0032329220985748","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Pepper Culpepper’s seminal Quiet Politics and Business Power has revitalized the study of when business elites can shape policies away from public scrutiny. This article takes the concept of quiet politics to a new, and surprising, set of actors: trade union leaders. Focusing on the case of Denmark, it argues that quiet politics functions through political elite networks and that this way of doing politics favors a particular kind of corporatist coordination between the state, capital, and labor. Rather than showing macrocorporatist coordination between the two classes and governments, it identifies representatives of business and labor that hold privileged positions in political elite networks. Representatives of segments are found in industries important for the Danish economy, specifically, the exporting manufacturing sector. Being at the core of the network requires not only a key position in the Danish economy but also an understanding that politics is often done best without politicians and voters. The analysis shows that trade union and business association representatives work closely on a wide number of issues through quiet politics, using their extensive network to broker and foster agreement between different stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0032329220985748","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Quiet Politics, Trade Unions, and the Political Elite Network: The Case of Denmark*\",\"authors\":\"C. Ibsen, C. Ellersgaard, Anton Grau Larsen\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/0032329220985748\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Pepper Culpepper’s seminal Quiet Politics and Business Power has revitalized the study of when business elites can shape policies away from public scrutiny. This article takes the concept of quiet politics to a new, and surprising, set of actors: trade union leaders. Focusing on the case of Denmark, it argues that quiet politics functions through political elite networks and that this way of doing politics favors a particular kind of corporatist coordination between the state, capital, and labor. Rather than showing macrocorporatist coordination between the two classes and governments, it identifies representatives of business and labor that hold privileged positions in political elite networks. Representatives of segments are found in industries important for the Danish economy, specifically, the exporting manufacturing sector. Being at the core of the network requires not only a key position in the Danish economy but also an understanding that politics is often done best without politicians and voters. The analysis shows that trade union and business association representatives work closely on a wide number of issues through quiet politics, using their extensive network to broker and foster agreement between different stakeholders.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47847,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Politics & Society\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0032329220985748\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Politics & Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220985748\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics & Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220985748","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
摘要
佩珀·卡尔佩珀(Pepper Culpepper)开创性的著作《安静的政治与商业权力》(Quiet Politics and Business Power),重新激活了对商业精英何时能够在不受公众监督的情况下制定政策的研究。本文将无声政治的概念介绍给一组新的、令人惊讶的参与者:工会领导人。以丹麦为例,它认为安静的政治通过政治精英网络发挥作用,这种政治方式有利于国家、资本和劳工之间的一种特殊的社团主义协调。它没有展示两个阶级和政府之间的宏观社团主义协调,而是确定了在政治精英网络中拥有特权地位的企业和劳工代表。各部门的代表在对丹麦经济有重要意义的行业,特别是出口制造业。要成为这个网络的核心,不仅需要在丹麦经济中占据关键地位,还需要理解,没有政治家和选民,政治往往做得最好。分析表明,工会和商业协会的代表通过悄无声息的政治手段,在广泛的问题上密切合作,利用其广泛的网络在不同的利益相关者之间斡旋和促进协议。
Quiet Politics, Trade Unions, and the Political Elite Network: The Case of Denmark*
Pepper Culpepper’s seminal Quiet Politics and Business Power has revitalized the study of when business elites can shape policies away from public scrutiny. This article takes the concept of quiet politics to a new, and surprising, set of actors: trade union leaders. Focusing on the case of Denmark, it argues that quiet politics functions through political elite networks and that this way of doing politics favors a particular kind of corporatist coordination between the state, capital, and labor. Rather than showing macrocorporatist coordination between the two classes and governments, it identifies representatives of business and labor that hold privileged positions in political elite networks. Representatives of segments are found in industries important for the Danish economy, specifically, the exporting manufacturing sector. Being at the core of the network requires not only a key position in the Danish economy but also an understanding that politics is often done best without politicians and voters. The analysis shows that trade union and business association representatives work closely on a wide number of issues through quiet politics, using their extensive network to broker and foster agreement between different stakeholders.
期刊介绍:
Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.