A. Kakhbod, Uliana Loginova, A. Malenko, Nadya Malenko
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Advising the Management: A Theory of Shareholder Engagement
We study the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, that is, shareholders communicating their views to management. When shareholders and management have different beliefs, each shareholder engages more effectively when other shareholders engage as well. A limited shareholder base can thus prevent effective engagement. However, a limited shareholder base naturally arises under heterogeneous beliefs because investors who most disagree with management do not become shareholders. Passive funds, which own the firm regardless of their beliefs, can counteract these effects and improve engagement. When shareholders’ and management’s preferences are strongly misaligned, shareholders’ engagement decisions become substitutes and the role of ownership structure declines.
期刊介绍：
The Review of Financial Studies is a prominent platform that aims to foster and widely distribute noteworthy research in financial economics. With an expansive editorial board, the Review strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary focus of paper selection is based on the quality and significance of the research to the field of finance, rather than its level of technical complexity. The scope of finance within the Review encompasses its intersection with economics. Sponsoring The Society for Financial Studies, the Review and the Society appoint editors and officers through limited terms.
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