真理、伦理与法律思想——从德沃金的《刺猬的正义》及其批判中得到的启示

IF 1.3 Q1 LAW Laws Pub Date : 2023-04-28 DOI:10.3390/laws12030042

Matthias Mahlmann

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摘要

本文重构了德沃金伦理学认识论的一些核心内容。为了理解为什么对德沃金来说，法律哲学问题会导致道德认识论，概述了德沃金最后一次重述法律理论的要点。在此背景下，本文批判性地评估了德沃金对当前突出的怀疑形式的批评的优点，以及它教会我们的法律思想认识论。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Truth, Ethics and Legal Thought—Some Lessons from Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and Its Critique

This paper reconstructs some of the core elements of Dworkin’s epistemology of ethics. To understand why, for Dworkin, questions of legal philosophy lead to moral epistemology, the main points of Dworkin’s last restatement of his theoretical account of law are outlined. Against this background, the paper critically assesses the merits of Dworkin’s criticism of current prominent forms of skepticism and what it teaches us about the epistemology of legal thought.

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