{"title":"科斯定理与空洞:四十年后的内脏检验","authors":"Varouj A. Aivazian , Jeffrey L. Callen","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2022.106117","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Ronald Coase pioneered the transaction cost approach to the modern analysis of institutions, contracts, and property rights. We argue that core theory enhances Coase’s transaction cost approach by injecting considerations of coalition formation and stability into the analysis. Analysis of coalitional stability also provides additional insights regarding the nature of transaction costs and the efficiency of institutional arrangements when there are such costs. Overcoming the empty core is potentially an important function of contracts, institutions, and property rights. Empty cores complement transaction costs in rationalizing real-world institutional arrangements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"73 ","pages":"Article 106117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Coase Theorem and the empty core: Inspecting the entrails after four decades\",\"authors\":\"Varouj A. Aivazian , Jeffrey L. Callen\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.irle.2022.106117\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Ronald Coase pioneered the transaction cost approach to the modern analysis of institutions, contracts, and property rights. We argue that core theory enhances Coase’s transaction cost approach by injecting considerations of coalition formation and stability into the analysis. Analysis of coalitional stability also provides additional insights regarding the nature of transaction costs and the efficiency of institutional arrangements when there are such costs. Overcoming the empty core is potentially an important function of contracts, institutions, and property rights. Empty cores complement transaction costs in rationalizing real-world institutional arrangements.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47202,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Review of Law and Economics\",\"volume\":\"73 \",\"pages\":\"Article 106117\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Review of Law and Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818822000734\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818822000734","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Coase Theorem and the empty core: Inspecting the entrails after four decades
Ronald Coase pioneered the transaction cost approach to the modern analysis of institutions, contracts, and property rights. We argue that core theory enhances Coase’s transaction cost approach by injecting considerations of coalition formation and stability into the analysis. Analysis of coalitional stability also provides additional insights regarding the nature of transaction costs and the efficiency of institutional arrangements when there are such costs. Overcoming the empty core is potentially an important function of contracts, institutions, and property rights. Empty cores complement transaction costs in rationalizing real-world institutional arrangements.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.