第12人的经济分析:球迷应该得到报酬吗?

Luc Arrondel , Jean-Pascal Gayant , Jean-François Laslier
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提供了一个体育联盟门票定价的理论模型。它考虑了通过高价格最大化比赛日收入和通过低价格最大化最具示范性球迷的支持之间的权衡。这些观众,即“超级观众”,与球队级别的人才一起,为俱乐部的竞争水平做出了贡献,因此间接增加了胜利的次数,从而增加了电视转播权的收入。我们对热情观众的角色进行了建模,并表明,在非合作纳什均衡中,俱乐部为充分利用第12人效应而补贴他们的存在可能是最优的。
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Economic analysis of the 12th man: Should the fans be paid?

The paper provides a theoretical sports league model to study the pricing of tickets. It considers the trade-off between maximizing match day revenues, through high prices, and maximizing the support of the most demonstrative fans, through low prices. These spectators, the “ultras” contribute to the competitive level of the club along with team-level talent, and therefore indirectly increase the number of victories, hence the revenue from TV rights. We model the role of effusive spectators and show that, in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, it may be optimal for the club to subsidize their presence in order to take full advantage of the 12th man effect.

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