论代理人合并或分立时破产问题的团结

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004
Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena , Peter Sudhölter
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在这篇文章中,我们研究了通过合并(分裂)的不可操作性和通过合并(分割)的强不可操纵性之间的关系。我们的分析表明,虽然这两个不可操作性公理通常不等价,但当团结原则得到满足时,它们确实一致。这一原则通过一系列破产规则来实现,包括参数规则。
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Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split

In this note, we investigate the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). Our analysis reveals that while these two non-manipulability axioms are generally not equivalent, they do coincide when the principle of solidarity is satisfied. This principle is fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules, including parametric rules.

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来源期刊
Mathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
审稿时长
59 days
期刊介绍: The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.
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