{"title":"叙述能力和道德责任","authors":"M. Griffith","doi":"10.1017/S026505251900030X","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: My main aim in this essay is to argue that “narrative capacity” is a genuine feature of our mental lives and a skill that enables us to become full-fledged morally responsible agents. I approach the issue from the standpoint of reasons-responsiveness. Reasons-responsiveness theories center on the idea that moral responsibility requires sufficient sensitivity to reasons. I argue that our capacity to understand and tell stories has an important role to play in this sensitivity. Without such skill we would be cut off from the full range of reasons to which moral agents need access and/or we would be deficient in the ability to weigh the reasons that we recognize. After arguing for the relevance of narrative skill, I argue that understanding the connection between reasons-sensitivity and narrative confers additional benefits. It illuminates important psychological structures (sometimes said to be missing from reasons-responsive accounts) and helps to explain some cases of diminished blame.","PeriodicalId":46601,"journal":{"name":"Social Philosophy & Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"93 - 113"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S026505251900030X","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"NARRATIVE CAPACITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY\",\"authors\":\"M. Griffith\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S026505251900030X\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract: My main aim in this essay is to argue that “narrative capacity” is a genuine feature of our mental lives and a skill that enables us to become full-fledged morally responsible agents. I approach the issue from the standpoint of reasons-responsiveness. Reasons-responsiveness theories center on the idea that moral responsibility requires sufficient sensitivity to reasons. I argue that our capacity to understand and tell stories has an important role to play in this sensitivity. Without such skill we would be cut off from the full range of reasons to which moral agents need access and/or we would be deficient in the ability to weigh the reasons that we recognize. After arguing for the relevance of narrative skill, I argue that understanding the connection between reasons-sensitivity and narrative confers additional benefits. It illuminates important psychological structures (sometimes said to be missing from reasons-responsive accounts) and helps to explain some cases of diminished blame.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46601,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Social Philosophy & Policy\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"93 - 113\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S026505251900030X\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Social Philosophy & Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505251900030X\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Philosophy & Policy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505251900030X","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: My main aim in this essay is to argue that “narrative capacity” is a genuine feature of our mental lives and a skill that enables us to become full-fledged morally responsible agents. I approach the issue from the standpoint of reasons-responsiveness. Reasons-responsiveness theories center on the idea that moral responsibility requires sufficient sensitivity to reasons. I argue that our capacity to understand and tell stories has an important role to play in this sensitivity. Without such skill we would be cut off from the full range of reasons to which moral agents need access and/or we would be deficient in the ability to weigh the reasons that we recognize. After arguing for the relevance of narrative skill, I argue that understanding the connection between reasons-sensitivity and narrative confers additional benefits. It illuminates important psychological structures (sometimes said to be missing from reasons-responsive accounts) and helps to explain some cases of diminished blame.
期刊介绍:
Social Philosophy and Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. The issues are thematic in format, examining a specific area of concern with contributions from scholars in different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science and law. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, some articles in each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The 2006 issues are "Justice and Global Politics" and "Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice". The 2007 issues will be "Liberalism: Old and New" and "Ancient Greek Political Theory".