消除团体代理

IF 1.2 2区 哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-12-27 DOI:10.1017/S0266267121000341
Lars J. K. Moen
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引用次数: 5

摘要

将个体一致的态度聚合起来可能产生不一致的集体态度。因此,一些群体需要有能力形成与其成员的态度不可简化的态度。群体代理现实主义者认为,这样的群体是控制自己态度形成的代理。然而,在本文中,我展示了群体代理现实主义如何忽略了一个重要的事实,即群体由战略上相互作用的代理组成。只有从我们的社会解释中消除群体代理,我们才能看到个人是如何策略性地投票以获得对群体的控制,并产生集体态度的,如果我们把群体视为代理,我们就无法理解这种集体态度。
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Eliminating Group Agency
Abstract Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
8.30%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.
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