{"title":"逻辑学作为一门规范科学:在生物学和社会批判之间(神经多样性的一个案例)","authors":"Gala V. Maksudova-Eliseeva","doi":"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-131-146","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses norms of reasoning in the context of a current tendency in recent discussions towards a broader interpretation of the norm. The author of the article compares two ideas about the norm: norms as arising within the framework of emancipatory social movements (on the example of the movement for neurodiversity), and norms associated with the understanding of logic as a normative science. It is shown that these directions are based on different concepts of the norm. Social movements understand the norm as derivative from social relations, while the modern norm in contemporary logic is understood as rule following. The question is raised what concept of the norm is more appropriate when reasoning is assessed. The article shows that social movements run the risk of expanding the norm of reasoning too much, because they focus on aspects of the social functioning of neurodifferent individuals, and they touch upon the issues of reasoning only in connection with cases of successful reasoning, sometimes completely ignoring the presence of stable patterns of unsuccessful reasoning. At the same time, logic, which is traditionally considered as a science that sets the norms of correct reasoning, on the contrary, in the case of a classical understanding of normativity as an unambiguous requirement to obey its canons, narrows the idea of correct reasoning. In this regard, logic was heavily criticized by social activists at the end of the twentieth century. In extreme cases, the critics called for a complete rejection of logic as a normative theory. However, within the logical theory, there is also a gradual process of expanding the norm. This process is associated, firstly, with a revision of ideas about the normativity of logic, and secondly, with the fact that logicians began to propose models of reasoning that are clearly erroneous from a pragmatic point of view. The author proposes solutions to the following tasks: firstly, she considers the main ideas of neurodiversity as well as the dialogical approach to understanding the normativity of logic; secondly, she considers the process of expanding the norm of reasoning within the framework of neurodiversity and logic.","PeriodicalId":41795,"journal":{"name":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Logic as a normative science: between biology and social critique (a case of neurodiversity)\",\"authors\":\"Gala V. Maksudova-Eliseeva\",\"doi\":\"10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-131-146\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The paper discusses norms of reasoning in the context of a current tendency in recent discussions towards a broader interpretation of the norm. The author of the article compares two ideas about the norm: norms as arising within the framework of emancipatory social movements (on the example of the movement for neurodiversity), and norms associated with the understanding of logic as a normative science. It is shown that these directions are based on different concepts of the norm. Social movements understand the norm as derivative from social relations, while the modern norm in contemporary logic is understood as rule following. The question is raised what concept of the norm is more appropriate when reasoning is assessed. The article shows that social movements run the risk of expanding the norm of reasoning too much, because they focus on aspects of the social functioning of neurodifferent individuals, and they touch upon the issues of reasoning only in connection with cases of successful reasoning, sometimes completely ignoring the presence of stable patterns of unsuccessful reasoning. At the same time, logic, which is traditionally considered as a science that sets the norms of correct reasoning, on the contrary, in the case of a classical understanding of normativity as an unambiguous requirement to obey its canons, narrows the idea of correct reasoning. In this regard, logic was heavily criticized by social activists at the end of the twentieth century. In extreme cases, the critics called for a complete rejection of logic as a normative theory. However, within the logical theory, there is also a gradual process of expanding the norm. This process is associated, firstly, with a revision of ideas about the normativity of logic, and secondly, with the fact that logicians began to propose models of reasoning that are clearly erroneous from a pragmatic point of view. The author proposes solutions to the following tasks: firstly, she considers the main ideas of neurodiversity as well as the dialogical approach to understanding the normativity of logic; secondly, she considers the process of expanding the norm of reasoning within the framework of neurodiversity and logic.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41795,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Filosofskii Zhurnal\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Filosofskii Zhurnal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-131-146\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filosofskii Zhurnal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-1-131-146","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Logic as a normative science: between biology and social critique (a case of neurodiversity)
The paper discusses norms of reasoning in the context of a current tendency in recent discussions towards a broader interpretation of the norm. The author of the article compares two ideas about the norm: norms as arising within the framework of emancipatory social movements (on the example of the movement for neurodiversity), and norms associated with the understanding of logic as a normative science. It is shown that these directions are based on different concepts of the norm. Social movements understand the norm as derivative from social relations, while the modern norm in contemporary logic is understood as rule following. The question is raised what concept of the norm is more appropriate when reasoning is assessed. The article shows that social movements run the risk of expanding the norm of reasoning too much, because they focus on aspects of the social functioning of neurodifferent individuals, and they touch upon the issues of reasoning only in connection with cases of successful reasoning, sometimes completely ignoring the presence of stable patterns of unsuccessful reasoning. At the same time, logic, which is traditionally considered as a science that sets the norms of correct reasoning, on the contrary, in the case of a classical understanding of normativity as an unambiguous requirement to obey its canons, narrows the idea of correct reasoning. In this regard, logic was heavily criticized by social activists at the end of the twentieth century. In extreme cases, the critics called for a complete rejection of logic as a normative theory. However, within the logical theory, there is also a gradual process of expanding the norm. This process is associated, firstly, with a revision of ideas about the normativity of logic, and secondly, with the fact that logicians began to propose models of reasoning that are clearly erroneous from a pragmatic point of view. The author proposes solutions to the following tasks: firstly, she considers the main ideas of neurodiversity as well as the dialogical approach to understanding the normativity of logic; secondly, she considers the process of expanding the norm of reasoning within the framework of neurodiversity and logic.