{"title":"解释葡萄牙电信行业批发接入价格的定义","authors":"V. Ribeiro, F. L. Pereira, Rui Gonçalves","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021024","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The 2016–2018 triennium was a period marked by a fierce dispute between the European Commission and Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações, Portugal, on the need to regulate wholesale access prices. While the European Commission defended the imposition of Fiber-To-The-x regulation in non-competitive areas, the Portuguese sectoral regulator argued in favor of the persistence of Fiber-To-The-x deregulation. Following a Game Theory approach, the present study demonstrates that the transition from Fiber-To-The-x deregulation to Fiber-To-The-x regulation should only occur when a given territorial unit becomes a competitive area since the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium captures a regulatory framework optimally characterized by the imposition of active access price deregulation (regulation) in non-competitive (competitive) areas, that is, local administrative units characterized by a weak (strong) degree of vertical spillover, respectively. Meanwhile, ducts access regulation must be permanently imposed throughout the national territory, despite it can be relaxed in competitive areas if the regulator imposes intra-flexibility to establish a monopolistic bottleneck to ensure social welfare maximization. Previous conclusions require to introduce both facility-based and service-based competition at the entry stage as well as active and passive obligations at the regulation stage in a multi-stage game with complete information. The present analysis legitimizes the emergence of a new optimization theory in the telecommunications literature, whose modus operandi is contrary to (coincident with) the ladder of investment theory in non-competitive (competitive) areas, respectively. Differently from the view sustained by the ladder of investment theory, which defends that a short-term regulatory touch combined with long-term market deregulation is a socially optimal strategy, the new theory confirms that a regulatory intervention is socially desirable only in the long run. The conceptual refinement is meticulously explained and labeled as the theory of creative creation because, differently from the Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction, whose processes of industrial mutation are permanently market-driven by assumption, a period of regulatory holidays followed by successive regulatory interventions dependent on the degree of vertical spillover observed in the telecommunications industry can effectively promote investment realization that continuously revolutionizes the market structure from within, incessantly destroying the old technology. The theory of creative creation reflects the regulatory framework currently in force in the Portuguese Telecommunications Industry.","PeriodicalId":1,"journal":{"name":"Accounts of Chemical Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":16.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Explaining the definition of wholesale access prices in the Portuguese telecommunications industry\",\"authors\":\"V. Ribeiro, F. L. Pereira, Rui Gonçalves\",\"doi\":\"10.3934/jdg.2021024\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The 2016–2018 triennium was a period marked by a fierce dispute between the European Commission and Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações, Portugal, on the need to regulate wholesale access prices. While the European Commission defended the imposition of Fiber-To-The-x regulation in non-competitive areas, the Portuguese sectoral regulator argued in favor of the persistence of Fiber-To-The-x deregulation. Following a Game Theory approach, the present study demonstrates that the transition from Fiber-To-The-x deregulation to Fiber-To-The-x regulation should only occur when a given territorial unit becomes a competitive area since the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium captures a regulatory framework optimally characterized by the imposition of active access price deregulation (regulation) in non-competitive (competitive) areas, that is, local administrative units characterized by a weak (strong) degree of vertical spillover, respectively. Meanwhile, ducts access regulation must be permanently imposed throughout the national territory, despite it can be relaxed in competitive areas if the regulator imposes intra-flexibility to establish a monopolistic bottleneck to ensure social welfare maximization. Previous conclusions require to introduce both facility-based and service-based competition at the entry stage as well as active and passive obligations at the regulation stage in a multi-stage game with complete information. The present analysis legitimizes the emergence of a new optimization theory in the telecommunications literature, whose modus operandi is contrary to (coincident with) the ladder of investment theory in non-competitive (competitive) areas, respectively. Differently from the view sustained by the ladder of investment theory, which defends that a short-term regulatory touch combined with long-term market deregulation is a socially optimal strategy, the new theory confirms that a regulatory intervention is socially desirable only in the long run. The conceptual refinement is meticulously explained and labeled as the theory of creative creation because, differently from the Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction, whose processes of industrial mutation are permanently market-driven by assumption, a period of regulatory holidays followed by successive regulatory interventions dependent on the degree of vertical spillover observed in the telecommunications industry can effectively promote investment realization that continuously revolutionizes the market structure from within, incessantly destroying the old technology. The theory of creative creation reflects the regulatory framework currently in force in the Portuguese Telecommunications Industry.\",\"PeriodicalId\":1,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Accounts of Chemical Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":16.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Accounts of Chemical Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021024\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"化学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounts of Chemical Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021024","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"化学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
2016-2018三年期间,欧盟委员会(European Commission)与葡萄牙国家高速公路(Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações)就监管批发接入价格的必要性发生了激烈争执。虽然欧盟委员会为在非竞争领域实施光纤到无线监管辩护,但葡萄牙部门监管机构辩称,支持继续放松光纤到无线监管。根据博弈论的方法,本研究表明,从光纤到光纤的监管过渡到光纤到光纤的监管应该只发生在给定的领土单位成为竞争区域时,因为子博弈完美纳什均衡捕获了一个监管框架,其最佳特征是在非竞争(竞争)区域实施主动接入价格放松管制(监管),即:地方行政单位垂直溢出分别表现为弱(强)度。与此同时,管道准入监管必须在全国范围内永久实施,尽管如果监管机构施加内部灵活性以建立垄断瓶颈以确保社会福利最大化,则可以在竞争领域放松监管。以往的结论要求在完全信息的多阶段博弈中,在准入阶段引入以设施为基础的竞争和以服务为基础的竞争,在监管阶段引入主动义务和被动义务。目前的分析证明了电信文献中出现的一种新的优化理论是合理的,这种理论的运作方式分别与非竞争性(竞争性)领域的投资阶梯理论相反(一致)。与投资阶梯理论所支持的观点不同,该理论认为,短期监管与长期市场放松管制相结合是一种社会最优策略,而新理论证实,监管干预只有在长期内才是社会理想的。这一概念的细化被细致地解释并贴上了创造性创造理论的标签,因为与熊彼特的创造性破坏理论不同,熊彼特的创造性破坏理论的工业突变过程永远是由假设驱动的,根据电信行业的垂直溢出程度,在一段时间的监管假期之后进行连续的监管干预,可以有效地促进投资实现,从而不断地从内部彻底改变市场结构,不断地破坏旧技术。创造性创造理论反映了葡萄牙电信业目前有效的监管框架。
Explaining the definition of wholesale access prices in the Portuguese telecommunications industry
The 2016–2018 triennium was a period marked by a fierce dispute between the European Commission and Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações, Portugal, on the need to regulate wholesale access prices. While the European Commission defended the imposition of Fiber-To-The-x regulation in non-competitive areas, the Portuguese sectoral regulator argued in favor of the persistence of Fiber-To-The-x deregulation. Following a Game Theory approach, the present study demonstrates that the transition from Fiber-To-The-x deregulation to Fiber-To-The-x regulation should only occur when a given territorial unit becomes a competitive area since the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium captures a regulatory framework optimally characterized by the imposition of active access price deregulation (regulation) in non-competitive (competitive) areas, that is, local administrative units characterized by a weak (strong) degree of vertical spillover, respectively. Meanwhile, ducts access regulation must be permanently imposed throughout the national territory, despite it can be relaxed in competitive areas if the regulator imposes intra-flexibility to establish a monopolistic bottleneck to ensure social welfare maximization. Previous conclusions require to introduce both facility-based and service-based competition at the entry stage as well as active and passive obligations at the regulation stage in a multi-stage game with complete information. The present analysis legitimizes the emergence of a new optimization theory in the telecommunications literature, whose modus operandi is contrary to (coincident with) the ladder of investment theory in non-competitive (competitive) areas, respectively. Differently from the view sustained by the ladder of investment theory, which defends that a short-term regulatory touch combined with long-term market deregulation is a socially optimal strategy, the new theory confirms that a regulatory intervention is socially desirable only in the long run. The conceptual refinement is meticulously explained and labeled as the theory of creative creation because, differently from the Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction, whose processes of industrial mutation are permanently market-driven by assumption, a period of regulatory holidays followed by successive regulatory interventions dependent on the degree of vertical spillover observed in the telecommunications industry can effectively promote investment realization that continuously revolutionizes the market structure from within, incessantly destroying the old technology. The theory of creative creation reflects the regulatory framework currently in force in the Portuguese Telecommunications Industry.
期刊介绍:
Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance.
Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.