{"title":"买家卡特尔:盛行与低收费","authors":"J. Connor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3883691","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article supplements information on 24 U.S. domestic buyers’ cartels cited in a 2010 book by Blair and Harrison by assembling and analyzing a sample of 49 episodes of buyers’ cartels that have international membership or multi-jurisdictional price effects. It appears that such cartels comprise less than 8 percent of the total, that they are clustered in primary-products and services industries, that they employ bid rigging conduct to a greater extent than sellers’ cartels, and that undercharges average close to 20 percent of the but-for price. These quantitative characteristics are supplemented by sketches of the conduct and prosecutions of a few of the better-documented cases of buyers’ cartels.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Buyers’ Cartels: Prevalence and Undercharges\",\"authors\":\"J. Connor\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3883691\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article supplements information on 24 U.S. domestic buyers’ cartels cited in a 2010 book by Blair and Harrison by assembling and analyzing a sample of 49 episodes of buyers’ cartels that have international membership or multi-jurisdictional price effects. It appears that such cartels comprise less than 8 percent of the total, that they are clustered in primary-products and services industries, that they employ bid rigging conduct to a greater extent than sellers’ cartels, and that undercharges average close to 20 percent of the but-for price. These quantitative characteristics are supplemented by sketches of the conduct and prosecutions of a few of the better-documented cases of buyers’ cartels.\",\"PeriodicalId\":11837,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"235 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3883691\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3883691","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article supplements information on 24 U.S. domestic buyers’ cartels cited in a 2010 book by Blair and Harrison by assembling and analyzing a sample of 49 episodes of buyers’ cartels that have international membership or multi-jurisdictional price effects. It appears that such cartels comprise less than 8 percent of the total, that they are clustered in primary-products and services industries, that they employ bid rigging conduct to a greater extent than sellers’ cartels, and that undercharges average close to 20 percent of the but-for price. These quantitative characteristics are supplemented by sketches of the conduct and prosecutions of a few of the better-documented cases of buyers’ cartels.