正当程序、公平竞争与过度党派之争:选举法司法审查的新原则

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW University of Chicago Law Review Pub Date : 2016-08-30 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2815892
E. Foley
{"title":"正当程序、公平竞争与过度党派之争:选举法司法审查的新原则","authors":"E. Foley","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2815892","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"American democracy is plagued by excessive partisanship, and yet constitutional law thus far has been incapable of redressing this ill. Gerrymandering is one clear example: the partisan distortion of legislative districts has accelerated dramatically in the last several decades, yet the federal judiciary has been unable to develop a constitutional standard for curbing this egregiously anti-democratic behavior. Likewise, state legislatures around the country in the last decade have been enacting statutes to cut back voting opportunities, and federal courts have struggled with articulating appropriate standards for evaluating the constitutionality of these rollback laws. A main reason for this struggle has been the judicial unwillingness to tackle directly the transparently partisan motives underlying these legislative cutbacks in voting opportunities. This judicial difficulty with curtailing excessive partisanship stems from an attempt to rely on equal protection as the relevant constitutional standard for judicial review of election laws. Invocation of equal protection is understandable given the initial success of Warren Court precedents, like Reynolds v. Sims and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, in using equal protection to protect equal voting rights. But as the courts have subsequently discovered, equal protection is ill-suited to the problems of gerrymander or legislation that cuts back voting opportunities for all voters. This Article offers a previously undeveloped alternative to equal protection: due process. In a wide range of areas, including civil and criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has long recognized that due process encompasses a principle of fair play. This fair play principle, well understood to apply in society to athletic competition, is suitable in the domain of politics for constraining excessive partisanship in electoral competition. In fact, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification reveals that this fair play principle played an essential role in constraining excessive partisanship that threatened to destabilize the Republic at the time the amendment’s ratification was under consideration in Congress. Once the significance of this history is recognized, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is properly construed as constraining partisan overreaching that currently threatens to undermine American democracy. In this way, the federal judiciary appropriately can invoke due process to directly redress excessive partisanship in the form of gerrymandering or rollbacks in voting opportunities.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"34 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2016-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws\",\"authors\":\"E. Foley\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2815892\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"American democracy is plagued by excessive partisanship, and yet constitutional law thus far has been incapable of redressing this ill. Gerrymandering is one clear example: the partisan distortion of legislative districts has accelerated dramatically in the last several decades, yet the federal judiciary has been unable to develop a constitutional standard for curbing this egregiously anti-democratic behavior. Likewise, state legislatures around the country in the last decade have been enacting statutes to cut back voting opportunities, and federal courts have struggled with articulating appropriate standards for evaluating the constitutionality of these rollback laws. A main reason for this struggle has been the judicial unwillingness to tackle directly the transparently partisan motives underlying these legislative cutbacks in voting opportunities. This judicial difficulty with curtailing excessive partisanship stems from an attempt to rely on equal protection as the relevant constitutional standard for judicial review of election laws. Invocation of equal protection is understandable given the initial success of Warren Court precedents, like Reynolds v. Sims and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, in using equal protection to protect equal voting rights. But as the courts have subsequently discovered, equal protection is ill-suited to the problems of gerrymander or legislation that cuts back voting opportunities for all voters. This Article offers a previously undeveloped alternative to equal protection: due process. In a wide range of areas, including civil and criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has long recognized that due process encompasses a principle of fair play. This fair play principle, well understood to apply in society to athletic competition, is suitable in the domain of politics for constraining excessive partisanship in electoral competition. In fact, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification reveals that this fair play principle played an essential role in constraining excessive partisanship that threatened to destabilize the Republic at the time the amendment’s ratification was under consideration in Congress. Once the significance of this history is recognized, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is properly construed as constraining partisan overreaching that currently threatens to undermine American democracy. In this way, the federal judiciary appropriately can invoke due process to directly redress excessive partisanship in the form of gerrymandering or rollbacks in voting opportunities.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51436,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of Chicago Law Review\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"3\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-08-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of Chicago Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2815892\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Chicago Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2815892","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

美国的民主被过度的党派之争所困扰,而宪法到目前为止还没有能力解决这个问题。不公正地划分选区就是一个明显的例子:在过去的几十年里,党派对立法选区的扭曲急剧加速,然而联邦司法部门却无法制定出一个宪法标准来遏制这种极端的反民主行为。同样,在过去的十年里,全国各地的州立法机构一直在制定法规来减少投票机会,联邦法院也一直在努力制定适当的标准来评估这些回调法律的合宪性。这场斗争的一个主要原因是,司法部门不愿直接处理这些立法削减投票机会背后明显的党派动机。这种限制过度党派之争的司法困难源于试图依靠平等保护作为对选举法进行司法审查的有关宪法标准。引用平等保护是可以理解的,因为沃伦法院的先例,如雷诺兹诉西姆斯案和哈珀诉弗吉尼亚选举委员会案,在利用平等保护来保护平等的投票权方面取得了初步成功。但正如法院随后发现的那样,平等保护并不适用于不公正划分选区或立法削减所有选民投票机会的问题。这条条款提供了一个以前未开发的平等保护替代方案:正当程序。在包括民事和刑事诉讼在内的广泛领域,最高法院早就认识到正当程序包含公平竞争的原则。这种公平竞争的原则,很好地应用于社会上的体育竞赛,也适用于政治领域,以限制选举竞争中过度的党派之争。事实上,第十四修正案的批准历史表明,在国会审议批准该修正案时,这种公平竞争原则在限制过度的党派之争方面发挥了至关重要的作用,这种党派之争有可能破坏共和国的稳定。一旦认识到这段历史的重要性,第十四条修正案的正当程序条款就可以被恰当地解释为限制党派越权,这种越权目前正威胁着美国的民主。通过这种方式,联邦司法机构可以适当地援引正当程序,以不公正地划分选区或减少投票机会的形式直接纠正过度的党派偏见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws
American democracy is plagued by excessive partisanship, and yet constitutional law thus far has been incapable of redressing this ill. Gerrymandering is one clear example: the partisan distortion of legislative districts has accelerated dramatically in the last several decades, yet the federal judiciary has been unable to develop a constitutional standard for curbing this egregiously anti-democratic behavior. Likewise, state legislatures around the country in the last decade have been enacting statutes to cut back voting opportunities, and federal courts have struggled with articulating appropriate standards for evaluating the constitutionality of these rollback laws. A main reason for this struggle has been the judicial unwillingness to tackle directly the transparently partisan motives underlying these legislative cutbacks in voting opportunities. This judicial difficulty with curtailing excessive partisanship stems from an attempt to rely on equal protection as the relevant constitutional standard for judicial review of election laws. Invocation of equal protection is understandable given the initial success of Warren Court precedents, like Reynolds v. Sims and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, in using equal protection to protect equal voting rights. But as the courts have subsequently discovered, equal protection is ill-suited to the problems of gerrymander or legislation that cuts back voting opportunities for all voters. This Article offers a previously undeveloped alternative to equal protection: due process. In a wide range of areas, including civil and criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has long recognized that due process encompasses a principle of fair play. This fair play principle, well understood to apply in society to athletic competition, is suitable in the domain of politics for constraining excessive partisanship in electoral competition. In fact, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification reveals that this fair play principle played an essential role in constraining excessive partisanship that threatened to destabilize the Republic at the time the amendment’s ratification was under consideration in Congress. Once the significance of this history is recognized, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is properly construed as constraining partisan overreaching that currently threatens to undermine American democracy. In this way, the federal judiciary appropriately can invoke due process to directly redress excessive partisanship in the form of gerrymandering or rollbacks in voting opportunities.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
期刊最新文献
Frankfurter, Abstention Doctrine, and the Development of Modern Federalism: A History and Three Futures Remedies for Robots Privatizing Personalized Law Order Without Law Democracy’s Deficits
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1