提高专利案件的利害关系

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Georgetown Law Journal Pub Date : 2013-02-13 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2216948
A. Malani, J. Masur
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引用次数: 184

摘要

专利侵权案件中的被告可以以被侵权专利无效为理由进行辩护。这一辩护,我们称之为专利挑战,旨在纠正这样一个事实,即专利商标局可能会授予无效的专利,而无效的专利会带来巨大的经济成本,而不会带来刺激创新的抵消效益。专利挑战旨在淘汰这些无效专利。不幸的是,专利挑战有缺陷。被告有时会成功地说服法院使一项真正有效的专利无效。在这些情况下,挑战降低了有效专利的回报,阻碍了有价值的创新。其他时候,法院支持无效专利,反对挑战。这对真正的创新征税,并将资源从生产性活动转向寻租。在本文中,我们提出是否有可能在不妨碍专利挑战在淘汰无效专利中的效用的情况下降低专利挑战对有效专利施加的成本。如果专利审判是不准确的,那么最明智的做法似乎是减少这些审判的风险。与直觉相反,我们建议提高专利诉讼的风险,为获胜的专利持有人提供更高的奖励,并对在审判中无效的专利所有者施加更高的惩罚。这些措施实际上会在有效专利和无效专利的持有人之间造成更大的分离,激励前者进行创新,同时阻止后者提起诉讼,甚至不主张他们在社会上毫无价值的财产权。
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Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases
Defendants in patent infringement cases are permitted to defend on the grounds that the infringed upon patent is invalid. This defense, which we call a patent challenge, is intended to correct for the fact that the Patent and Trademark Office may grant patents that are invalid, and invalid patents impose significant economic costs without the offsetting benefit of spurring innovation. Patent challenges are intended to weed out these invalid patents. Unfortunately, patent challenges have flaws. Defendants sometimes succeed in convincing a court to invalidate a truly valid patent. In these cases, challenges reduce the returns to valid patents and discourage valuable innovation. Other times, a court upholds an invalid patent against a challenge. This imposes a tax on genuine innovation and shifts resources toward rent-seeking and away from productive activities. In this paper we ask whether it is possible to reduce the costs patent challenges impose on valid patents without hampering the utility of patent challenges in weeding out invalid patents. If patent trials are inaccurate, it would appear that the most sensible course of action would be to reduce the stakes of those trials. Counter-intuitively, we propose raising the stakes of patent litigation by providing enhanced rewards to victorious patent holders and imposing enhanced penalties on owners of patents that are invalidated at trial. Such measures would actually create greater separation between holders of valid and invalid patents, incentivizing innovation by the former while dissuading the latter from litigating or even asserting their socially worthless property rights.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Georgetown Law Journal is headquartered at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. and has since its inception published more than 500 issues, as well as the widely-used Annual Review of Criminal Procedure (ARCP). The Journal is currently, and always has been, run by law students.
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