董事会的咨询和监督作用——来自破坏性事件的证据

E. Croci, G. Hertig, Layla Khoja, Luh Luh Lan
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引用次数: 8

摘要

我们通过评估董事在危机时期的咨询和监督角色的相对重要性来研究董事对公司弹性的贡献。基于手工收集的美国数据,我们证明了四个与董事会相关的变量会影响市场对破坏性事件的反应。董事会独立性和具有行业专业知识的董事的存在加剧了负股价效应,而董事忙碌和董事会规模则相反。这些反应表明,在危机时期,以建议为导向的董事会比以监督为导向的董事会表现得更好。
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The Advisory and Monitoring Roles of the Board - Evidence from Disruptive Events
We study the contribution of directors to firm resilience by assessing the relative importance of their advisory and monitoring roles at times of crisis. Based on manually collected US data, we document that four bord-related variables affect market reactions around disruptive events. Board independence and the presence of directors with industry expertise exacerbate the negative share price effect, whereas the converse is true for director busyness and board size. These reactions imply that, in times of crisis, advice-oriented boards fare better than monitoring-oriented boards.
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