没有垄断者的垄断:比特币支付系统的经济分析

Gur Huberman, Jacob D. Leshno, C. Moallemi
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引用次数: 366

摘要

比特币为用户提供与传统支付系统类似的交易处理服务。本文模拟了比特币创新的去中心化设计所隐含的新型经济结构,它允许支付系统由称为矿工的不相关方可靠地操作。我们发现这种去中心化的设计可以保护用户免受垄断定价的影响。平台内服务提供商之间的竞争和免费进入意味着没有任何实体能够影响用户支付的费用水平。相反,交易处理市场决定了用户为获得优先级和避免交易处理延迟而支付的费用。本文(i)推导了费用和等待时间的封闭公式,并研究了它们的性质,(ii)比较了比特币支付系统下的定价与利润最大化公司运营的传统支付系统下的定价,(iii)建议修改协议设计以提高平台的效率。附录描述并解释了比特币和底层区块链技术的主要属性。
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Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
Bitcoin provides its users with transaction-processing services which are similar to those of traditional payment systems. This article models the novel economic structure implied by Bitcoin’s innovative decentralized design, which allows the payment system to be reliably operated by unrelated parties called miners. We find that this decentralized design protects users from monopoly pricing. Competition among service providers within the platform and free entry imply no entity can profitably affect the level of fees paid by users. Instead, a market for transaction-processing determines the fees users pay to gain priority and avoid transaction-processing delays. The article (i) derives closed-form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties, (ii) compares pricing under the Bitcoin Payment System to that under a traditional payment system operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and (iii) suggests protocol design modifications to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The Appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.
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