关于证券交易委员会规则14a-8(I)(10)的意见信,2015年6月18日

J. Brown
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引用次数: 1

摘要

这封信的重点是SEC对规则14a-8(i)(10)的解释。该条款允许发行人排除已“实质性实施”的股东提案。传统上,这被用来排除因公司行为而变得“没有实际意义”的提案。然而,公司不必“完全”执行股东提案。因此,员工经常被要求确定公司所做的改变是否实质性。意见书讨论的是,公司通过提议,要求拥有一定股份比例的股东有权召开特别会议,但将合格股份限制在一定时间内的情况下,员工的立场。
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Comment Letter on Rule 14a-8(I)(10), Securities & Exchange Commission, June 18, 2015
This letter focuses on SEC interpretations of Rule 14a-8(i)(10). The provision allows issuers to exclude shareholder proposals that have been “substantially implemented.” This has traditionally been used to allow for the exclusion of proposals rendered “moot” by the company’s actions. Companies, however, need not implement the shareholder proposal “exactly.” As a result, the staff is often asked to determine whether changes made by the company are substantial. The comment letter discusses positions taken by the staff where the company adopts a proposal asking that shareholders with a specified percentage of shares have the right to call a special meeting but limits eligible shares to those held for a specified period of time.
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