意识形态信仰偏向政治三段论

IF 2.5 3区 心理学 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL Thinking & Reasoning Pub Date : 2020-04-02 DOI:10.1080/13546783.2019.1688188
D. Calvillo, Alexander B. Swan, Abraham M. Rutchick
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引用次数: 11

摘要

当个体更愿意接受与自己的信念一致的结论,而不是不一致的结论时,就会出现推理中的信念偏差。本研究考察了包含政治内容的三段论中的信念偏差。在两个实验中,参与者判断结论是否有效,完成政治意识形态测试,并完成认知反射测试。这些结论在有效性和政治意识形态(保守派或自由派)上各不相同。参与者对三段论的有效性和保守性敏感。总的来说,他们表现出自由主义的偏见,接受更自由的结论而不是保守的结论。此外,保守的参与者比自由的参与者更容易接受保守的结论,而自由的参与者则表现出相反的模式。认知反射并没有像被动机系统2推理对被动机意识形态推理的解释所预测的那样放大这种效应。这些结果表明,不同意识形态的人可能会从相同的证据中接受不同的结论。
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Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms
Abstract The belief bias in reasoning occurs when individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than conclusions that are inconsistent. The present study examined a belief bias in syllogisms containing political content. In two experiments, participants judged whether conclusions were valid, completed political ideology measures, and completed a cognitive reflection test. The conclusions varied in validity and in their political ideology (conservative or liberal). Participants were sensitive to syllogisms’ validity and conservatism. Overall, they showed a liberal bias, accepting more liberal than conservative conclusions. Furthermore, conservative participants accepted more conservative conclusions than liberal conclusions, whereas liberal participants showed the opposite pattern. Cognitive reflection did not magnify this effect as predicted by a motivated system 2 reasoning account of motivated ideological reasoning. These results suggest that people with different ideologies may accept different conclusions from the same evidence.
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来源期刊
Thinking & Reasoning
Thinking & Reasoning PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
6.50
自引率
11.50%
发文量
25
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