别人的生活

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI:10.1093/arisup/akad009

Katalin Farkas

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摘要

根据笛卡尔的思想概念，我可以是一个孤独的存在，但我仍然拥有和现在一样的精神状态。本文将探讨其他人的生活如何符合这一概念。我研究了第二人称视角——在与他人进行相互交流互动时将他人视为“你”——并认为它在认识论上和形而上学上都没有区别。我还认为，笛卡尔的图景解释了为什么其他人是特别的:因为他们的重要性不仅仅在于他们对我们的影响。

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The Lives of Others

On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.

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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

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