In Defense of Disinformation

Abstract Disinformation is not as intuitively understood in the security disciplines as those speaking about it seem to believe. Where we do find definitions, they vary considerably. As a result, the term has become politized and, instead, has lost value. Given the shallow roots behind classifying content as disinformation, it is not surprising that it has been sucked into the hyperpolarized maelstrom of politics and the media. That is unfortunate, given that disinformation is a demonstrated element of national power. Adversaries such as Russia have wielded the concept as an effective weapon to undermine and weaken rivals. Incorporating a framework through which disinformation can be identified anchors the term for security professionals. Without such an anchor, disinformation will continue to blow about aimlessly. I identify three criteria that a piece of content must successfully be passed through to qualify as disinformation. The first criterion is that the identity of the content originator is intentionally masked; second, the released information is harmful or destructive content intended to influence an outcome; and lastly, the originator has a predetermined political, military, economic, or social objective. Failure to defend disinformation and frame it properly leaves a confused homeland apparatus and weaker national security.