美国劳动力的竞业禁止协议

Evan Starr, JJ Prescott, Norman Bishara
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引用次数: 39

摘要

通过对11,505名劳动力参与者的全国代表性调查数据,我们研究了竞业禁止协议的使用和实施以及与这些条款相关的员工结果。大约18%的劳动力参与者受到竞业禁止协议的约束,38%的人过去至少同意过一项竞业禁止协议。竞业禁止条款更可能出现在高技能、高收入的工作岗位上,但在低技能、低收入的工作岗位上,以及在竞业禁止条款无法执行的州,这种情况也很常见。只有10%的员工会就竞业禁止条款进行谈判,大约三分之一的员工在已经接受了工作机会后,才会收到竞业禁止条款。提前通知竞业禁止协议与更好的员工绩效相关,而同意晚通知竞业禁止协议的员工则相对较差。然而,不考虑竞业禁止的时机,在竞业禁止更容易执行的地方,工资相对较低。我们讨论这些发现的竞争理论的经济价值的非竞争。
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Noncompete Agreements in the US Labor Force
Using nationally representative survey data on 11,505 labor force participants, we examine the use and implementation of noncompete agreements and the employee outcomes associated with these provisions. Approximately 18 percent of labor force participants are bound by noncompetes, with 38 percent having agreed to at least one in the past. Noncompetes are more likely to be found in high-skill, high-paying jobs, but they are also common in low-skill, low-paying jobs and in states where noncompetes are unenforceable. Only 10 percent of employees negotiate over their noncompetes, and about one-third of employees are presented with noncompetes after having already accepted job offers. Early-notice noncompetes are associated with better employee outcomes, while employees who agree to late-notice noncompetes are comparatively worse off. Regardless of noncompete timing, however, wages are relatively lower where noncompetes are easier to enforce. We discuss these findings in light of competing theories of the economic value of noncompetes.
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