年轻的联邦地区法院法官支持总统权力

T. Campbell, N. Wilcox
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引用次数: 0

摘要

从1960年到2015年,美国联邦地区法院法官(初审法官)在涉及挑战行政部门权威的案件中的意见显示,随着年龄的增长,这些法官越来越不支持行政当局。我们建议地区法官知道,随着年龄的增长,晋升到联邦巡回上诉法院的可能性越来越小,因此与行政部门合作的理由也越来越少。政治变量、法官的资历和其他作为额外回归变量引入的变量并不能逆转这一主要结果,它似乎也不是群体效应或地区法院选择的产物。当巡回法院同时出现空缺时,11个州巡回法院的地区法官(不包括哥伦比亚特区巡回法院)也更有可能支持行政法官。
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Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power
From 1960 to 2015, opinions of US federal district court judges (trial judges) in cases involving challenges to executive branch authority show that these judges favor executive authority less as they age. We suggest that district judges know that elevation to the federal circuit court of appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to cooperate with the executive, with advancing age. Political variables, seniority of judges, and other variables introduced as extra regressors do not reverse this main result, nor does it appear to be the product of cohort effects or selection off the district court. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their circuit courts, district judges in the 11 state circuits (but not the District of Columbia Circuit) are also more likely to favor the executive.
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