Private emotions as contingency descriptors: emotions, emotional behavior, and their evolution

ABSTRACT Whereas emotional behavior can easily be included in a behavior analytic account, emotion as private experience has proven much more difficult. I will argue that simply considering the private experience of emotion as covert behavior, stimuli (to be gained or avoided), or motivating operations is not satisfactory. The fact of private experience presents definitional problems not encountered when considering public behavior. The problem of privacy as elucidated by Skinner (1953, 1963, 1974) and Wittgenstein (1953) is discussed and a possible solution provided. This solution is based upon an approach first described by Israel Goldiamond (1979a) which treats private emotions as indicators or descriptors – non-spoken tacts – of consequential contingencies. The experience of emotion is considered as occurring with, and determined by, the contingency. In this account, emotions neither cause behavior nor are caused by behavior; they are instead part of consequential contingencies. The differences among emotions reflect the differences in contingencies described. Once “made public”, however, emotion may become linked to “emotional behavior”, which is then maintained by its consequences. The approach appears consistent across species and suggests a common evolutionary origin as first suggested by Darwin (1872).