{"title":"工会的优势:工会会员资格,获得医疗服务,以及《平价医疗法案》。","authors":"Luke Petach, David K Wyant","doi":"10.1007/s10754-022-09336-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We describe a \"union advantage\" in health insurance coverage and access to care. Using multiple statistical models and data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for 1996-2019, we show that-compared to non-union workers-union workers are more likely to have health insurance coverage (98% vs. 86%), more likely to have a regular care provider (83% vs. 74%), visited office-based providers 31% more often (5.64 vs. 4.27 visits), spend $832 more on healthcare annually, and pay a lower share of their expenditures out-of-pocket (26% vs. 37%). When we control for demographic characteristics across variety of specifications, these differences almost always remain at a statistically significant level. Further, we show that the union advantage is greater for low-income workers. Next, we demonstrate that-although the Affordable Care Act (ACA) appears to have reduced the union advantage in health insurance coverage by increasing coverage rates among non-union workers-a substantial union advantage in access to care remains after the ACA's main provisions become effective. Finally, we explore how the ACA interacted with the trade union goal of maintaining employer-based health insurance. We show that unionized workers are less likely to contribute to \"enrollment shifting,\" which occurs when individuals shift from existing employer-based insurance to a new government funded program. This suggests that union bargaining over fringe benefits may have positive externalities in the form of cost reductions to the public sector.</p>","PeriodicalId":44403,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Health Economics and Management","volume":"23 1","pages":"1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9261128/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The union advantage: union membership, access to care, and the Affordable Care Act.\",\"authors\":\"Luke Petach, David K Wyant\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10754-022-09336-7\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>We describe a \\\"union advantage\\\" in health insurance coverage and access to care. Using multiple statistical models and data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for 1996-2019, we show that-compared to non-union workers-union workers are more likely to have health insurance coverage (98% vs. 86%), more likely to have a regular care provider (83% vs. 74%), visited office-based providers 31% more often (5.64 vs. 4.27 visits), spend $832 more on healthcare annually, and pay a lower share of their expenditures out-of-pocket (26% vs. 37%). When we control for demographic characteristics across variety of specifications, these differences almost always remain at a statistically significant level. Further, we show that the union advantage is greater for low-income workers. Next, we demonstrate that-although the Affordable Care Act (ACA) appears to have reduced the union advantage in health insurance coverage by increasing coverage rates among non-union workers-a substantial union advantage in access to care remains after the ACA's main provisions become effective. Finally, we explore how the ACA interacted with the trade union goal of maintaining employer-based health insurance. We show that unionized workers are less likely to contribute to \\\"enrollment shifting,\\\" which occurs when individuals shift from existing employer-based insurance to a new government funded program. This suggests that union bargaining over fringe benefits may have positive externalities in the form of cost reductions to the public sector.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44403,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Health Economics and Management\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"1-26\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9261128/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Health Economics and Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-022-09336-7\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Health Economics and Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-022-09336-7","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The union advantage: union membership, access to care, and the Affordable Care Act.
We describe a "union advantage" in health insurance coverage and access to care. Using multiple statistical models and data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for 1996-2019, we show that-compared to non-union workers-union workers are more likely to have health insurance coverage (98% vs. 86%), more likely to have a regular care provider (83% vs. 74%), visited office-based providers 31% more often (5.64 vs. 4.27 visits), spend $832 more on healthcare annually, and pay a lower share of their expenditures out-of-pocket (26% vs. 37%). When we control for demographic characteristics across variety of specifications, these differences almost always remain at a statistically significant level. Further, we show that the union advantage is greater for low-income workers. Next, we demonstrate that-although the Affordable Care Act (ACA) appears to have reduced the union advantage in health insurance coverage by increasing coverage rates among non-union workers-a substantial union advantage in access to care remains after the ACA's main provisions become effective. Finally, we explore how the ACA interacted with the trade union goal of maintaining employer-based health insurance. We show that unionized workers are less likely to contribute to "enrollment shifting," which occurs when individuals shift from existing employer-based insurance to a new government funded program. This suggests that union bargaining over fringe benefits may have positive externalities in the form of cost reductions to the public sector.
期刊介绍:
The focus of the International Journal of Health Economics and Management is on health care systems and on the behavior of consumers, patients, and providers of such services. The links among management, public policy, payment, and performance are core topics of the relaunched journal. The demand for health care and its cost remain central concerns. Even as medical innovation allows providers to improve the lives of their patients, questions remain about how to efficiently deliver health care services, how to pay for it, and who should pay for it. These are central questions facing innovators, providers, and payers in the public and private sectors. One key to answering these questions is to understand how people choose among alternative arrangements, either in markets or through the political process. The choices made by healthcare managers concerning the organization and production of that care are also crucial. There is an important connection between the management of a health care system and its economic performance. The primary audience for this journal will be health economists and researchers in health management, along with the larger group of health services researchers. In addition, research and policy analysis reported in the journal should be of interest to health care providers, managers and policymakers, who need to know about the pressures facing insurers and governments, with consequences for regulation and mandates. The editors of the journal encourage submissions that analyze the behavior and interaction of the actors in health care, viz. consumers, providers, insurers, and governments. Preference will be given to contributions that combine theoretical with empirical work, evaluate conflicting findings, present new information, or compare experiences between countries and jurisdictions. In addition to conventional research articles, the journal will include specific subsections for shorter concise research findings and cont ributions to management and policy that provide important descriptive data or arguments about what policies follow from research findings. The composition of the editorial board is designed to cover the range of interest among economics and management researchers.Officially cited as: Int J Health Econ ManagFrom 2001 to 2014 the journal was published as International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics. (Articles published in Vol. 1-14 officially cited as: Int J Health Care Finance Econ)