Perceived Motives of Public Diplomacy Influence Foreign Public Opinion.

IF 3.3 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Behavior Pub Date : 2023-01-02 DOI:10.1007/s11109-022-09849-4
Kasey Rhee, Charles Crabtree, Yusaku Horiuchi
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Abstract

Although many countries engage in public diplomacy, we know relatively little about the conditions under which their efforts create foreign support for their desired policy outcomes. Drawing on the psychological theory of "insincerity aversion," we argue that the positive effects of public diplomacy on foreign public opinion are attenuated and potentially even eliminated when foreign citizens become suspicious about possible hidden motives. To test this theory, we fielded a survey experiment involving divergent media frames of a real Russian medical donation to the U.S. early in the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that an adapted news article excerpt describing Russia's donation as genuine can decrease American citizens' support for sanctions on Russia. However, exposing respondents to information suggesting that Russia had political motivations for their donation is enough to cancel out the positive effect. Our findings suggest theoretical implications for the literature on foreign public opinion in international relations, particularly about the circumstances under which countries can manipulate the attitudes of other countries' citizens.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09849-4.

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公共外交的认知动机影响外国舆论。
尽管许多国家都在开展公共外交,但我们对这些国家的努力在何种条件下能使外国支持其预期的政策成果却知之甚少。借鉴 "不诚实厌恶 "的心理学理论,我们认为,当外国公民对公共外交可能隐藏的动机产生怀疑时,公共外交对外国舆论的积极影响就会减弱,甚至可能消失。为了验证这一理论,我们进行了一项调查实验,涉及不同媒体对 COVID-19 大流行初期俄罗斯向美国捐赠医疗设备的报道。我们发现,将俄罗斯的捐赠描述为真实捐赠的改编新闻文章节选会降低美国公民对制裁俄罗斯的支持。然而,如果受访者接触到的信息表明俄罗斯的捐款具有政治动机,则足以抵消这种积极效应。我们的研究结果为国际关系中的外国舆论研究提供了理论依据,特别是关于在何种情况下国家可以操纵他国公民的态度:在线版本包含补充材料,可查阅 10.1007/s11109-022-09849-4。
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来源期刊
Political Behavior
Political Behavior POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
8.40
自引率
5.10%
发文量
70
期刊介绍: Political Behavior publishes original research in the general fields of political behavior, institutions, processes, and policies. Approaches include economic (preference structuring, bargaining), psychological (attitude formation and change, motivations, perceptions), sociological (roles, group, class), or political (decision making, coalitions, influence). Articles focus on the political behavior (conventional or unconventional) of the individual person or small group (microanalysis), or of large organizations that participate in the political process such as parties, interest groups, political action committees, governmental agencies, and mass media (macroanalysis). As an interdisciplinary journal, Political Behavior integrates various approaches across different levels of theoretical abstraction and empirical domain (contextual analysis). Officially cited as: Polit Behav
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