Demystifying the Risk Assessment Process for Laboratory-Based Experiments Utilizing Invasive Genetic Elements: It Is More Than Gene Drive.

IF 0.5 Q4 PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH Applied Biosafety Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI:10.1089/apb.20.0074
Zach N Adelman
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Advances in recombinant DNA approaches have resulted in the development of transgene architectures that severely bias their own inheritance, a process commonly referred to as "gene drive." The rapid pace of development, combined with the complexity of many gene drive approaches, threatens to overwhelm those responsible for ensuring its safe use in the laboratory, as even identifying that a specific transgene is capable of gene drive may not be intuitive. Although currently gene drive experiments have been limited to just a few species (mosquitoes, flies, mice, and yeast), the range of organisms used in gene drive research is expected to increase substantially in the coming years. Here the defining features of different gene drive approaches are discussed. Although this will start with a focus on identifying when gene drive could or could not occur, the emphasis will also be on establishing risk profiles based on anticipated level of invasiveness and persistence of transgenes in the surrounding environment. Attention is also called to the fact that transgenes can be considered invasive without being considered gene drive (and vice versa). This further supports the notion that adequate risk assessment requires information regarding the specific circumstances a given transgene or set of transgenes is capable of invading a corresponding population. Finally, challenges in the review and evaluation of work involving gene drive organisms are discussed.

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揭秘利用侵入性遗传元素的实验室实验的风险评估过程:它不仅仅是基因驱动。
重组DNA方法的进步导致了转基因结构的发展,这种结构严重影响了自身的遗传,这一过程通常被称为“基因驱动”。快速发展的步伐,加上许多基因驱动方法的复杂性,可能会让那些负责确保其在实验室中安全使用的人感到不知所措,因为即使确定特定的转基因能够进行基因驱动,也可能不是直观的。虽然目前基因驱动实验仅限于少数物种(蚊子、苍蝇、老鼠和酵母),但用于基因驱动研究的生物范围预计在未来几年将大幅增加。这里讨论了不同基因驱动方法的定义特征。虽然这将从确定基因驱动何时可能发生或不可能发生开始,但重点也将放在根据转基因在周围环境中的预期侵入性和持久性水平建立风险概况上。还需要注意的是,转基因可以被认为是侵入性的,而不被认为是基因驱动(反之亦然)。这进一步支持了这样一种观点,即充分的风险评估需要关于特定转基因或一组转基因能够入侵相应人群的具体情况的信息。最后,讨论了涉及基因驱动生物的工作的审查和评估中的挑战。
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来源期刊
Applied Biosafety
Applied Biosafety Environmental Science-Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
13.30%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Applied Biosafety (APB), sponsored by ABSA International, is a peer-reviewed, scientific journal committed to promoting global biosafety awareness and best practices to prevent occupational exposures and adverse environmental impacts related to biohazardous releases. APB provides a forum for exchanging sound biosafety and biosecurity initiatives by publishing original articles, review articles, letters to the editors, commentaries, and brief reviews. APB informs scientists, safety professionals, policymakers, engineers, architects, and governmental organizations. The journal is committed to publishing on topics significant in well-resourced countries as well as information relevant to underserved regions, engaging and cultivating the development of biosafety professionals globally.
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