Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation.

IF 1.5 4区 医学 Q3 PSYCHIATRY Cognitive Neuropsychiatry Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI:10.1080/13546805.2022.2119839
Martin Davies, Max Coltheart
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Introduction: Cotard delusion-the delusional belief "I am dead"-is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard. Ramachandran and Blakeslee proposed that the idea "I am dead" comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if "I am dead" were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world.

Methods: We scrutinised the literature on people who expressed the delusional belief "I am dead", looking for data on whether such patients are reported as entirely lacking in emotional responsivity.

Results: In numerous cases, patients with Cotard delusion are described as experiencing emotions including anxiety, fear, guilt, distress, euphoria and worry.

Conclusions: We conclude that complete absence of emotional responsivity cannot be what prompts the delusional idea that one is dead. We propose that, in at least some cases, the idea "I am dead" comes to mind in response to symptoms of depersonalisation or derealisation, often present in cases of Cotard delusion, and give examples of Cotard patients with abnormalities in various neural areas that could be responsible for the presence of such symptoms.

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精神病妄想,情感体验和人格解体。
简介:科塔尔妄想症——一种相信“我已经死了”的妄想——是以第一个描述这种妄想症的法国精神病学家——儒勒·科塔尔命名的。Ramachandran和Blakeslee提出,当一种神经病理状况导致对世界的情感反应完全消失时,“我死了”的想法就会出现在脑海中。这个想法会作为一种假定的解释出现:如果“我死了”是真的,那么就不会对世界产生情感反应。方法:我们仔细研究了那些表达“我死了”妄想信念的人的文献,寻找这些病人是否被报告为完全缺乏情绪反应的数据。结果:在许多病例中,科塔尔妄想患者被描述为经历焦虑、恐惧、内疚、痛苦、欣快和担忧等情绪。结论:我们得出的结论是,完全没有情绪反应不可能是导致一个人产生死亡错觉的原因。我们认为,至少在某些情况下,“我死了”的想法是对人格解体或现实解体症状的反应,通常出现在科塔尔妄想的病例中,并给出了科塔尔患者在各种神经区域异常的例子,这些神经区域异常可能导致这些症状的出现。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
18
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (CNP) publishes high quality empirical and theoretical papers in the multi-disciplinary field of cognitive neuropsychiatry. Specifically the journal promotes the study of cognitive processes underlying psychological and behavioural abnormalities, including psychotic symptoms, with and without organic brain disease. Since 1996, CNP has published original papers, short reports, case studies and theoretical and empirical reviews in fields of clinical and cognitive neuropsychiatry, which have a bearing on the understanding of normal cognitive processes. Relevant research from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive neuropsychology and clinical populations will also be considered. There are no page charges and we are able to offer free color printing where color is necessary.
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