NEGATIVE INTRA-GROUP EXTERNALITIES IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS*

IF 1.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS International Economic Review Pub Date : 2009-01-28 DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00529.x
Paul Belleflamme, Eric Toulemonde
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra-group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter-group externalities.

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双边市场中的负组内外部性*
两种类型的代理在已有的免费平台上交互。代理积极评价其他类型代理的存在,但可能消极评价自己类型代理的存在。我们的问题是,新平台能否找到费用和补贴,从而将代理商从现有平台分流出去,从而盈利。我们表明,如果组内负外部性相对于组间正外部性足够(但不是太)强,这可能是不可能的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
0.00%
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0
期刊介绍: The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.
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