Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data

I. Rubinstein
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引用次数: 66

Abstract

In the past several election cycles, presidential campaigns and other well-funded races for major political offices have become data-driven operations. Presidential campaign organizations and the two main parties (and their data consultants) assemble and maintain extraordinarily detailed political dossiers on every American voter. These databases contain hundreds of millions of individual records, each of which has hundreds to thousands of data points. Because this data is computerized, candidates benefit from cheap and nearly unlimited storage, very fast processing, and the ability to engage in data mining of interesting voter patterns. The hallmark of data-driven political campaigns is voter microtargeting, which political actors rely on to achieve better results in registering, mobilizing and persuading voters and getting out the vote on or before Election Day. Voter microtargeting is the targeting of voters in a highly individualized manner based on statistical correlations between their observable patterns of offline and online behavior and the likelihood of their supporting a candidate and casting a ballot for him or her. In other words, modern political campaigns rely on the analysis of large data sets in search of useful and unanticipated insights, an activity that is often summed up with the phrase “big data.” Despite the importance of big data in U.S. elections, the privacy implications of data-driven campaigning have not been thoroughly explored much less regulated. Indeed, political dossiers may be the largest unregulated assemblage of personal data in contemporary American life. This Article seeks to remedy this oversight. It proceeds in three parts. Part I offers the first comprehensive analysis of the main sources of voter data and the absence of legal protection for this data and related data processing activities. Part II considers the privacy interests of individuals in both their consumer and Internet-based activities and their participation in the political process, organizing the analysis under the broad rubrics of information privacy and political privacy. That is, it asks two interrelated questions: first, whether the relentless profiling and microtargeting of American voters invades their privacy (and if so what harm it causes) and, second, to what extent do these activities undermine the integrity of the election system. It also examines three reasons why political actors minimize privacy concerns: a penchant for secrecy that clashes with the core precept of transparent data practices; a tendency to rationalize away the problem by treating all voter data as if it were voluntarily provided or safely de-identified (and hence outside the scope of privacy law) while (falsely) claiming to follow the highest commercial privacy standards; and, a mistaken embrace of commercial tracking and monitoring techniques as if their use has no impact on the democratic process. Part III presents a moderate proposal for addressing the harms identified in Part II consisting in (1) a mandatory disclosure and disclaimer regime requiring political actors to be more transparent about their campaign data practices; and (2) new federal privacy restrictions on commercial data brokers and a complementary “Do Not Track” mechanism enabling individuals (who also happen to be voters) to decide whether and to what extent commercial firms may track or target their online activity. The article concludes by asking whether even this moderate proposal runs afoul of political speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. It makes two arguments. First, the Supreme Court is likely to uphold mandatory privacy disclosures and disclaimers based on doctrines developed and re-affirmed in the leading campaign finance cases, which embrace transparency over other forms of regulation. Second, the Court will continue viewing commercial privacy regulations as constitutional under longstanding First Amendment doctrines, despite any incidental burdens they may impose on political actors, and notwithstanding its recent decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, which is readily distinguishable.
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大数据时代的选民隐私
在过去的几个选举周期中,总统竞选和其他资金充足的主要政治职位竞选已经成为数据驱动的行动。总统竞选组织和两大主要政党(以及他们的数据顾问)收集并维护每一位美国选民极其详细的政治档案。这些数据库包含数亿条单独的记录,每条记录都有数百到数千个数据点。由于这些数据是计算机化的,因此候选人可以从廉价且几乎无限的存储、非常快的处理以及对有趣的选民模式进行数据挖掘的能力中受益。数据驱动的政治运动的特点是选民微目标,政治行为者依靠微目标在选举日当天或之前登记、动员和说服选民以及动员选民投票方面取得更好的结果。选民微目标(Voter microtargeting)是以高度个性化的方式针对选民,其依据是选民可观察到的离线和在线行为模式与他们支持某位候选人并为其投票的可能性之间的统计相关性。换句话说,现代政治活动依赖于对大数据集的分析,以寻找有用的和意想不到的见解,这种活动通常用“大数据”这个词来概括。尽管大数据在美国选举中很重要,但数据驱动的竞选活动对隐私的影响尚未得到彻底探讨,监管更少。事实上,政治档案可能是当代美国生活中最大的不受监管的个人数据集合。本文试图弥补这一疏忽。本文分为三个部分。第一部分首次全面分析了选民数据的主要来源以及对这些数据和相关数据处理活动缺乏法律保护的情况。第二部分考虑了个人在其消费和基于互联网的活动以及他们参与政治过程中的隐私利益,在信息隐私和政治隐私的广泛规则下组织分析。也就是说,它提出了两个相互关联的问题:第一,对美国选民进行无情的定性和微观定位是否侵犯了他们的隐私(如果是的话,它会造成什么伤害);第二,这些活动在多大程度上破坏了选举制度的完整性。它还研究了政治行为者将隐私问题最小化的三个原因:对保密的偏好与透明数据实践的核心原则相冲突;通过将所有选民数据视为自愿提供或安全去识别(因此不在隐私法的范围内)来合理化问题的倾向,同时(错误地)声称遵循最高的商业隐私标准;而且,错误地接受商业跟踪和监控技术,好像它们的使用对民主进程没有影响一样。第三部分提出了一个温和的建议,以解决第二部分中确定的危害,包括:(1)强制性披露和免责制度,要求政治行为者对其竞选数据做法更加透明;(2)对商业数据经纪人的新的联邦隐私限制和补充的“不跟踪”机制,使个人(也恰好是选民)能够决定商业公司是否以及在多大程度上可以跟踪或瞄准他们的在线活动。文章最后问道,即使是这个温和的提议,是否也与宪法第一修正案保障的政治言论权相冲突。它有两个论点。首先,最高法院可能会支持强制性的隐私披露和免责声明,这些原则是在主要的竞选资金案件中发展和重申的,这些案件比其他形式的监管更重视透明度。第二,法院将继续根据长期存在的第一修正案原则将商业隐私法规视为符合宪法的,尽管它们可能给政治行为者带来任何附带负担,尽管法院最近在索雷尔诉艾美思健康案(Sorrell v. IMS Health)一案中做出了很容易区分的决定。
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